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When "Extraordinary" Means Illegal:
International Law and European Reaction
to the United States Rendition Program
MATrEO M. WINKLER*
The power of our society to'stand up against its enemies is
based on its recognition that it is fighting for values that deserve
protection. The rule of law is one of these values t
I. "I ATE IN THE BEST RESTAURANTS OF EGYPT."
Hassan Mustafa Osama Nasr, a.k.a. Abu Omar, is not just a
name. He is a true story. As a member of the extremist Egyptian
organization "Jamaa Islamiya," Abu Omar is closely associated
with certain key Al Qaeda affiliates.' In 1997, after long stays in
Afghanistan and Bosnia, and shorter stays in Albania and various
cities in Italy, Abu Omar moved to Milan where he became an
imam at the local mosque.
On February 17, 2003, Abu Omar was walking to his mosque
from Via Guerzoni, a narrow and isolated road, when he was
approached by two unknown men. Unprovoked and with no
explanation, the two men suddenly injected Abu Omar with a
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'HCJ 168/91, Morcos v. Minister of Defense [1991] IsrSC 45(1) 467, 470-471 (opinion of
Aharon Barak).
1. See GUIDO OLIMPIO, OPERAZIONE HOTEL CALIFORNIA 36 (2005).
2. Id. at 26-27.
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
sedative, pushed him in a van, and drove away. A woman walking
on the other side of Via Guerzoni also witnessed the abduction.'
Three days later, Abu Omar's wife informed the police of her
husband's disappearance The Italian antiterrorism task force,
DIGOS,6 immediately suspected a kidnapping. In mid-March, the
United States informed the Italian services that Abu Omar was
being held in the Balkans In mid-April, the Italian police were
able to wiretap several phone calls from Abu Omar to his wife.9
Surprisingly, these calls were made to a number in Egypt - not to
the Balkans."° In one of these phone calls, Abu Omar claimed to
have eaten "in the best Egyptian restaurants."" In truth, he had
been brutally tortured by the Egyptians.'2 Abu Omar endured
electric shocks to his genitals and excruciatingly loud music.'3 As a
result of this treatment, Abu Omar became incontinent and lost
his hearing in one ear."
All of Abu Omar's calls to his wife and friends were
wiretapped, including one call to a friend who later collaborated
with the prosecutors. 5 The DIGOS began its investigation by
analyzing phone calls made to and from Via Guerzoni on February
17, 2003.16 Its discoveries were astonishing. Calls from Via
Guerzoni had been placed to phones in Langley, Virginia, the U.S.
embassy in Milan, and the Aviano Airbase in Pordenone, Italy.7 It
was later revealed that a call was placed between the U.S. embassy
in Milan and Egypt on the day of the capture and that further calls
3. Id. at 27.
4. Id.
5. See id. at 26: Omar's wife contacted the police on February 20, informing them
that she last saw her husband on February 17. Id.
6. DIGOS means "Direzione Investigazioni Generali e Operationi Speciali"
[Department of General Investigations and Special Operations] and is the core of
antiterrorist investigation structure in Italy.
7. See OLIMPIO, supra note 1, at 26.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 27.
10. See id.
11. Id. at 29 ("Ho mangiato nei migliori ristoranti d'Egitto").
12. See id. at 25-36.
13. Id. at 29-39; see also Stephen Grey & Don Van Natta, Jr., In Italy, Anger at U.S.
Tactics Colors Spy Case, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2005, at A4.
14. OLIMPIO, supra note 1, at 28; see also Grey & Van Natta, supra note 13, at A4.
15. Craig Whitlock, CIA Ruse is Said to Have Damaged Probe in Milan, WASH. POST,
Dec. 6, 2005, at Al.
16. OLIMPIO,supra note 1, at 30-31.
17. Id. at 31-32.
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were made intil mid-March 2003.8 This led Italian investigators to
a U.S. diplomat at the embassy in Milan. 9 Clearly, the U.S. Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) had been involved in the kidnapping.
Abu Omar's case is not an isolated incident. There are other
stories like his, perhaps even hundreds. On October 23, 2001,
Jamil Qasim Saeed Mohammed, a Yemeni national suspected in
the bombing of U.S.S. Cole in 2000, was moved by CIA agents
from Karachi, Pakistan to Jordan, after being taken into custody
by Pakistani intelligence, the ISI.0 Another incident concerned an
Australian and Egyptian national named Mahdouh Habib, who
was taken from Pakistan to Egypt.' Mahdouh Habib was forced,
by way of torture, to sign a confession of affiliation with Al Qaeda,
which he subsequently retracted. In December 2001, Swedish
authorities (the Sakerhetpolisen or SAPO) arrested two men,
Ahmed Agiza and Mohammed Zeri, and rushed them to Egypt,
where they were subjected to the worst abuses imaginable. 3 In
2002, Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi was arrested in Afghanistan and
moved to the U.S.S. Bataan in the Persian Sea before he was
eventually handed over to Egyptian authorities.24 Information
obtained through the torture of al-Libi has been used to create a
link between Osama bin Laden's organization and Saddam
18. Id. at 31.
19. Id.
20. See TREVOR PAGLEN & A.C. THOMPSON, TORTURE TAXI: ON THE TRAIL OF
THE CIA'S RENDITION FLIGHTS 59-60 (2006). The event became known because the
operators of the plane used to transport Jamil Qasim Saeed Mohammed refused to pay
the landing fees due to the Pakistani airport authorities. The plane was therefore unable to
take off and eventually, ISI officials had to intervene.
21. Mahdouh Habib was arrested in Karachi, while he was on a bus, on October 5,
2001. He was detained in Egypt, then in Afghanistan, and finally ended up in Guantanamo
Bay. Raymond Bonner, Detainee Says He Was Tortured While in U.S. Custody, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 13, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/02/13/international/middleeast
13habib.html [hereinafter Bonner, Detainee Says He Was Tortured]. He was released in
January 2005, and now is involved in certain political activity in New South Wales.
Raymond Bonner, Ex-Captive in Guantanamo Makes Run for Office in Australia, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 21, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/21/world/asia/21habib.html
[hereinafter Bonner, Ex-Captive Makes Run for Office].
22. Bonner, Detainee Says He Was Tortured, supra note 21.
23. See Stephen Grey, United States: Trade in Torture, LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE,
Apr. 2005, http://mondediplo.com/2005/04/04usatorture; see also PAGLEN & THOMPSON,
supra note 20 at 60-61.
24. See Dana Priest, Al Qaeda-Iraq Link Recanted: Captured Libyan Reverses
Previous Statement to CIA, Officials Say, WASH. POST, Aug. 1, 2004, at A20; see also The
United States' "Disappeared": The CIA's Long-Term "Ghost Detainees" 24-25 (Human
Rights Watch Briefing Paper, Oct. 2004), available at http://www.hrw.orglbackgrounder/
usa/us1004/us1004.pdf.
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Hussein.25 Al-Libi later recanted this statement, and the CIA was
unable to substantiate either his statement given under
interrogation or his subsequently recanted statement.26 In the same
year, Binyam Mohammed, an Ethiopian student who lived in
London, was abducted in Pakistan and moved to Morocco where
he was tortured during interrogations. 7 In September 2002, a
Canadian citizen, Maher Arar, was seized by U.S. immigration
authorities while traveling from Tunis to Montr6al via New York's
John F. Kennedy International Airport.' He was forcibly moved to
Syria - a member of the so-called "Axis of Evil, 29 - where he was
detained for almost a year in a dirty, three-feet by six-feet cell."
Syrian authorities also beat him and threatened him with
electrocution. 1 In March 2002, Abou Elkassim Britel, a Moroccan
and Italian national, was removed from Pakistan to Morocco
where he was subjected to torture and sentenced to nine years in
prison after a secret trial.32 On New Year's Eve 2003, Khaled el-
Masri - whose name was confused with that of Khalid al-Masri, a
significant Al Qaeda member linked to the "Hamburg cell" - was
arrested at the border checkpoint at Tabanovce, Macedonia, and
25. See Priest, supra note 24, at A20.
26. Id.
27. See MI6 and CIA 'Sent Student to Morocco to be Tortured,' OBSERVER (London),
Dec. 11, 2005, World News, at 20, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2005/dec/
11/politics.alqaida.
28. See Katherine R. Hawkins, Note, The Promises of Torturers: Diplomatic
Assurances and the Legality of "Rendition," 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 213, 213 (2006).
29. Because Syria is in the so-called "Axis of Evil," the United States can hardly
justify the sending of a terrorist to that country; yet, obviously there are certain political
junctures between Syria and the United States, under which they actually collaborate,
especially because of the presence of American forces in the nearby Iraq. Presumably, the
same reason brought the United States to halt renditions to Syria. See Hawkins, supra note
28, at 263. Moreover, "[elven when diplomatic relations between two countries are
strained, as they are between the United States and Syria, sometimes intelligence services
are able to work out mutually beneficial deals. That is, sometimes the relationship
between spymasters is quite different from the relationship between diplomats. Not always
do the scenes on stage correspond with that goes on off the stage." A. John Radsan, A
More Regular Process for Irregular Rendition, 37 SETON HALL L. REV. 1, 24 (2006).
30. See Hawkins, supra note 28, at 214-15.
31. Id. The case of Maher Arar is particularly well-known because of the
international and domestic implications following Arar's release.
32. A good summary of Britel's accident is contained in a parliamentary inquiry,
raised by some members of the Italian Parliament to the government. See Senate of
Republic (Italy), Act No. 3-00291 (Dec. 12, 2006). See also Renditions: Italian and
European MPs Set to Request Pardon for Abou Elkassim Britel, STATEWATCH, Jan. 2007,
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2007/jan/lObritel.htm.
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then transferred to a CIA facility in Afghanistan.3 Here, el-Masri
was detained, interrogated and tortured for five months.' He was
finally released, but only after his story came to the personal
attention of U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. 5 The list
does not end there. 6
Turning back to Abu Omar, on June 23, 2005, an Italian
public prosecutor obtained a warrant from Judge Chiara Nobili of
the Tribunal of Milan authorizing the arrest of thirteen CIA agents
for Abu Omar's abduction. 7 One day later, another judge, Judge
Guido Salvini, issued a warrant against Abu Omar charging him
with international terrorism. 8 In the order seeking Abu Omar's
pretrial incarceration, Judge Salvini affirmed that "Abu Omar's
kidnapping is not only illegal, for it breached Italian sovereignty,
but it is also an ill-omened and polluting act with regard to the
whole fight against terrorism." 9 In Judge Salvini's view, Abu Omar
was a victim of an Extraordinary Rendition Program (ERP).0
33. Innocent German Beaten by US Jailers, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Apr. 25,
2005, http://www.smh.com.au/news/Global-Terrorism/Innocent-German-beaten-by-US-
jailers/2005/04/24/1 114281451199.html.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. For a complete list, see the case annex to Beyond Guantdnamo: Transfers to
Torture One Year After Rasul v. Bush (NYU School of Law, Ctr. for Human Rights &
Global Justice, 2005), available at http://www.chrgj.org/docs/Case%20Annex%2OFinal.pdf.
37. Arrest Warrant Nos. 10838/05 R.G.N.R. & 1966/05 R.G.GIP, Tribunale di Milano
(June 22, 2005), available at http://www.statewatch.org/rendition/rendition.html.
38. Ordinanza di applicazione della misura della custodia cautelare in cacere [Order
Establishing the Imprisonment Provisional Measure], Nos. 5236/02 R.G.N.R & 1511/02
R.G.GIP, Tribunale di Milano (June 24, 2005) [hereinafter Salvini's Order], available at
http://www.statewatch.org/cia/documents/milan-tribunal-abu-omar.pdf.
39. Salvini's Order, supra note 38, at 10 ("[q]uindi il sequestro di Abu Omar non solo
6 stato illegale avendo violato gravemente la sovranitA italiana ma 6 stato anche un atto
nefasto e inquinante ai fini dell'efficacia della complessiva lotta al terrorismo").
40. Id. The word "rendition" has no technical meaning. "The term is, of course, a
euphemism for abduction and subsequent transfer designed to circumvent ordinary
extradition procedures." David Weissbrodt & Amy Bergquist, Extraordinary Rendition
and the Torture, 46 VA. J. INT'L L. 585, 586 (2006). Moreover, "]t]his is not a term used in
international law. The term refers to one State obtaining custody over a person suspected
of involvement in serious crime (e.g. terrorism) in the territory of another State and/or the
transfer of such a person to custody in the first State's territory, or a place subject to its
jurisdiction, or to a third State. 'Rendition' is thus a general term referring more to the
result - obtaining of custody over a suspected person - rather than the means." Eur.
Comm'n for Democracy Through Law [Venice Comm'n], Opinion on the International
Legal Obligations of Council of Europe Member States in Respect of Secret Detention
Facilities and Inter-State Transport of Prisoners, 30, CDL-AD(2006)009 (Mar. 17, 2006),
available at http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2006/CDL-AD(2006)009-e.asp. In fact, the only
legal context in which the term is used is in the United States, where an appropriate
38 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. [Vol. 30:33
Under the law it goes by another term: abduction, or in French,
enlevement criminaL
4 1
This article addresses the illegality of the ERP.2 In fact, ERP
actions raise important legal questions from both domestic and
international viewpoints.43 Its legality has been challenged in
several ways, through public debates and condemnations,
diplomatic protests, and lawsuits." This article argues that the
current international law framework, fueled by a fierce European
campaign against the ERP, clearly demonstrates the illegality of
this program. As background, Part II reviews the factual and legal
structure of the ERP. Part III analyzes the ERP as a violation of
international law norms concerning the ban on torture. Part IV
examines inconsistencies in European reactions to the ERP and
the way in which these reactions may affect future ERP
exploitation by the U.S. government. Part V concludes that the
ERP is wholly inconsistent with international law.
II. UNDER THE COLOR OF "ADAPTATION"
U.S. policy-makers make use of the adjective "extraordinary"
in describing the ERP. Actions can be "extraordinary" if they are
contingent on a particular moment or characterized by unusual
circumstances. Therefore, characterizing the rendition program as
"extraordinary" could either indicate that the ERP is part of a
"rendition clause" at the federal constitutional level provides for the surrendering of
individuals between the states. See U.S. CONST., art. IV, § 2.
41. Salvini's Order, supra note 38, at 10 n.9. Salvini explains that the term
"extraordinary rendition" has no technical denotation and seems rather justificatory, while
under international law such an action is called "abduction," or, in French, "enlevement
criminal." See Vincent Coussirat-Coust~re & Pierre M. Eisemann, L'enlevement des
personnes privies et le droit international, 76 REVUE GENERALE DE DROIT INT'L PUBLIC
346 (1972) (Fr.). Abduction is another term for kidnapping, which is defined as "the crime
of forcibly abducting a person from his or her own country and sending the person to
another." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 886 (8th ed. 2004) (defining "kidnapping").
42. Significantly, "[w]hether a particular 'rendition' is lawful will depend upon the
laws of the States concerned and on the applicable rules of international law, in particular
human rights. Thus, even if a particular 'rendition' is in accordance with the national law
of one of the States involved (which may forbid or even regulate extraterritorial activities
of State organs), it may still be unlawful under the national law of the other State(s).
Moreover, a 'rendition' may be contrary to customary international law and treaty or
customary obligations undertaken by the participating State(s) under human rights law
and/or international humanitarian law." Venice Comm'n, supra note 40, 30.
43. This article will not address the problem of the ERP's consistency with the U.S.
Constitution. Some issues concerning the problem of secrecy will be dealt with infra at
Part IV.
44. ALFRED W. MCCOY, A QUESTION OFTORTURE 171-77 (2006).
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larger government strategy for emergency response to global
terror, or .that its legal framework is specifically connected to
particular situations. It could also mean, however, that the
rendition program is lawless. 5 Yet, none of these explanations do
justice to the true legacy of the ERP.
Although the ERP is intimately connected with the global
fight against terrorists, ERP-type actions took place well before
9/11. ' The legal framework for the U.S. ERP originated in
Presidential Directives issued to the CIA in 1995."7 At that time,
the administration of President William J. Clinton was stirred to
action by a wave of terrorism including the 1993 World Trade
Center bombing and the 1995 bombings in Oklahoma City and
Tokyo. Although there was no single terrorist group linked to
these events, the U.S. government decided to expand the CIA's
powers in order to prevent further tragedies." Thus, President
Clinton enacted the Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 39:
When terrorists wanted for violation of U.S. law are at large
overseas, their return for prosecution shall be a matter of the
highest priority .... If we do not receive adequate cooperation
from a state that harbors a terrorist whose extradition we are
seeking, we shall take appropriate measures to induce
cooperation. Return of suspects by force may be. effected
without the cooperation of the host government . 9
45. See Venice Comm'n, supra note 40, 31.
46. In 1995, in Zagreb, Croatia, CIA agents seized an Egyptian, Talaat Fouad
Quassem, an alleged extremist, detained him for interrogation on a ship in the Adriatic
Sea, and then transferred him to Egypt, where he disappeared. His family believes that he
was executed in Egypt. See Anthony Shadid, US, Egypt Raids Caught Militants, BOSTON
SUNDAY GLOBE, Oct. 7, 2001, at Al. In 1998, five people were grabbed by the Albanian
police and moved to Egypt on a CIA flight. Rajiv Chandrasekaran & Peter Finn, U.S.
Behind Secret Transfer of Terror Suspects, WASH. POST, Mar. 11, 2002, at Al. In the same
year, three people, Ahmed Salama Mabrouk, Essam Hafez, and Ihab Muhammad Saqr
were transferred by the CIA from Azerbaijan to Egypt and tortured there. Susan Sachs, A
Nation Challenged: Bin Laden's Allies; An Investigation in Egypt Illustrates Al Qaeda's
Web, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2001, at Al.
47. See, e.g., Presidential Decision Directive 39, U.S. Policy on Counterterrorism
(June 21, 1995), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd39.htm.
48. Douglas Kash, Abducting Terrorists Under PDD-39: Much Ado About Nothing
New, 13 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 139,141 (1997).
49. Presidential Decision Directive 39, supra note 47; see also Kash, supra note 48, at
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
Initially, the principal addressee of PDD 39 was the FBI." It
directed U.S. agencies to identify terrorists and then seek the
cooperation of the involved country.' Identification and
cooperation were the paradigms underlying PDD 39. Upon
locating the terrorist, PDD 39 suggests the following: "[o]nce the
terrorist is located . . . more detailed information . . . is usually
required to effect an arrest. Intelligence officers and their sources
on the scene are usually better able to do that than enforcement
officers from the United States." 2 By the terms of the directive,
efficiency and efficacy require the exploitation of local intelligence
agencies that maintain contacts and collect information at a local
level, which enforcement agencies such as the FBI rarely have at
their disposal."s
Enlisting the help of local intelligence agencies, however, has
its drawbacks. Cooperation between law enforcement entities of
different countries is usually based on treaties, especially in the
context of extraditions. 4 These treaties are only concluded
following long negotiations between the concerned governments,
and their enforcement can be both time consuming and rife with
political roadblocks. Arguably, this would impede the effectiveness
of PDD 39 by delaying the ability of the United States to collect
intelligence through interrogations of terror suspects. If the ability
to gather this intelligence is frustrated, counterterrorism measures
could not move as quickly, leaving terrorists more time to plan
deadly attacks. This is the logic that prompted the U.S.
government to entrust its rendition strategies solely to the CIA,
eschewing cooperation with local, foreign intelligence agencies and
ignoring enforceable extradition treaties."s In pursing its rendition
strategies, the CIA's actions are constrained solely by the goals of
prevention and immediate political convenience. 6  While
50. See YONAH ALEXANDER, COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGIES: SUCCESSES AND
FAILURES OF Six NATIONS 9,29 (2006).
51. Presidential Decision Directive 39, supra note 47.
52. PAUL R. PILLAR, TERRORISM AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 118 (2001).
53. Id.
54. See, e.g., ISIDORO ZANOTTI, EXTRADITION IN MULTILATERAL TREATIES AND
CONVENTIONS 48-89 (2006).
55. Presidential Decision Directive 39, supra note 47.
56. Specifically, "[t]he rendition techniques ... are extraordinary in the legal sense,
since extradition exists as an ordinary legal process. However, recourse to these
techniques may well be due to the frustration of a requesting state following formal
channels of rendition." M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION: UNITED
STATES LAW AND PRACTICE 251 (4th ed. 2002).
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prevention comports with the traditional identification-
cooperation duality of PDD 39,57 prevention as it is practiced by
the CIA loses the cooperation aspect; those who have relevant
information (such as the CIA) act directly, even if such action is
unlawful.
But what justification allows the CIA to violate international
law in pursuit of the U.S. government's rendition strategies?
During a press conference on the eve of her visit to Europe in
December of 2005, Condoleezza Rice stated that the "[rienditions
[carried out by the CIA] . . . save lives." 8 When asked to
specifically respond to the claims that some European countries
were hosting CIA prisons for interrogating and torturing suspected
terrorists, she neither denied nor confirmed their existence.59
Instead, Rice gave this response:
We must track down terrorists who seek refuge in areas ...
where the terrorists cannot in practice be reached by the
ordinary processes of law.... The captured terrorists of the 21st
century do not fit easily into traditional systems of criminal or
military justice, which were designed for different needs. We
have to adapt.
Essentially, the rendition strategies of the U.S. government
can be seen as an "adaptation" to the evolving terrorist threat. The
concept of "adaptation" was the theme of Rice's entire speech.61
Clearly, this recourse to "adaptation" represents an effort to bring
actions, which evidently have no legal basis, under existing laws.
Rice assumes that the changing world environment has made some
international laws antiquated and that international law must
therefore evolve with the changing environment.62 Consequently,
Rice believes that the rendition strategies of the U.S. government
57. Presidential Decision Directive 39, supra note 47.
58. 'Renditions Save Lives': Condoleezza Rice's Full Statement, TIMES ONLINE
(London), Dec. 5, 2005, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/us and-americas/
article745995.ece.
59. Id. Currently the public knows that these prisons exist and are located in Poland
and Romania. See Eur. Parl. Ass. Comm. on Legal Affairs & Human Rights, Secret
Detentions and Illegal Transfer of Detainees Involving the Council of Europe Member
States: Second Report, at 40-41, Doc. No. 11302 rev. (June 11, 2007) [hereinafter Secret
Detentions: Second Report].
60. 'Renditions Save Lives': Condoleezza Rice's Full Statement, supra note 58.
61. Id. "The captured terrorists of the 21st century do not fit easily into traditional
systems of criminal or military justice, which were designed for different needs. We have
to adapt." Id.
62. See id.
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
are a response to the changing world environment and are
therefore compatible with international law.63
An example of this misguided view on the necessity of
"adaptation" is represented by the U.S. government's attempt to
arrange typical operations of criminal justice, such as arrest of
suspects, outside the framework of the ordinary criminal process.'
This arrangement emerges from the so-called "Memorandum of
Notification," a classified directive signed by President George W.
Bush on September 17, 2001.65 This directive allows the CIA to
render terrorists without governmental approval and establishes
measures restraining individual freedoms without due process of
law (i.e., a formal indictment).' It also allows the CIA to carry out
renditions abroad, without any formal criminal charge, merely for
the purpose of interrogation.67 Rice justifies this right to rendition
as an "adaptation" of intelligence structures in order to achieve
the goal of neutralizing dangerous terrorists.6' Nevertheless, as
demonstrated below, the ERP remains essentially beyond the law.
Claiming that the goal of prevention makes rendition actions legal
is anything but well-grounded.
III. THE COMPLEX LEGACY OF THE ERP
There are two main phases of each ERP action. First, a
person is abducted - a forced and illegal taking of an individual
allegedly made legal by the ERP.69 This component clearly entails
restraint on physical freedom, and may also necessarily involve the
use of violence. Second, ERP actions involve the transfer of an
63. See id. Rice added that "[i]n some situations a terrorist suspect can be extradited
according to traditional judicial procedures. But there have long been many other cases
where, for some reason, the local government cannot detain or prosecute a suspect, and
traditional extradition is not a good option. In those cases the local government can make
the sovereign choice to cooperate in a rendition. Such renditions are permissible under
international law and are consistent with the responsibilities of those governments to
protect their citizens." Id.
64. Shaun Waterman, Ex-CIA Lawyer Calls for Law on Rendition, SPACE WAR,
Mar. 9, 2005, http://www.spacewar.com/news/2005/upinews-030905-1410-52.html.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. 'Renditions Save Lives': Condoleezza Rice's Full Statement, supra note 58.
69. See EI-Masri v. United States [EI-Masri II], 479 F.3d 296, 300 (4th Cir. 2007)
(stating that the ERP is "the clandestine abduction and detention outside the United
States of persons suspected of involvement in terrorist activities using methods
impermissible under U.S. and international laws" (emphasis added)).
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individual to a country where law enforcement authorities or
intelligence agencies practice torture." To be sure, "[t]here were
no cases where a prisoner Was released, or had contact with a
family member, human rights worker, or other visitor, and did not
make any allegations of torture."7 The CIA's continuing program
of enlisting the assistance of these countries for purposes of
torture72 indicates that the CIA must believe torture to be an
effective way of obtaining information. The apparent justification
of the ERP is that another country is doing the "dirty job" of
interrogating the suspected terrorist.
A. Can Abduction be Justified?
Under classic international law, states have a duty to refrain
from exercising their sovereign powers within the territory of other
states.3 Accordingly, the taking of foreign citizens in a foreign
country is generally forbidden. 4 If the taking is illegal under
international law, one should use the term "abduction. '"7 5 As a
matter of sovereignty, however, the territorial state can consent to
the operation, in which case the taking is considered perfectly
legal. 6
Customary international law permits an international law
violation if it is justified by the violated state's consent.r Consent,
however, must be "valid" and the violation must respect the limits
70. See EI-Masri v. Tenet [EI-Masri I], 437 F. Supp. 2d 530, 537 (E.D. Va. 2006)
("[S]ince the early 1990s the CIA has been operating interrogation centers in countries
where the United States believes legal safeguards do not constrain efforts to interrogate
suspected terrorists. This practice is commonly known as 'extraordinary rendition."'
(emphasis added)).
71. Hawkins, supra note 28, at 264 (emphasis added).
72. See EI-Masri 1, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 537; El-Masri II, 479 F.3d at 300.
73. See S.S. "Lotus" (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 9 (Sept. 7).
74. See S.C. Res. 579, pmbl., U.N. Doc. S/RES/579 (Dec. 18, 1985) (Under
international law, abduction still stands as an "offence . . . of grave concern to the
international community, having severe consequences for the rights of the victims and for
the promotion of friendly relations and co-operation among States.").
75. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 41, at 886 (defining "kidnapping").
76. U.N. Int'l Law Comm'n, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for
Internationally Wrongful Acts, art. 20, U.N. Supp. Doc. Supp. 10 (A/56/10) [hereinafter
Draft Articles].
77. Id. This principle translates into a customary international law norm. See id.
(stating that ("[v]alid consent by a State to the commission of a given act by another State
precludes the wrongfulness of that act in relation to the former State to the extent that the
act remains within the limits of that consent.").
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of that consent.7' The question of whether consent is valid is
generally governed by the applicable international law norms,
particularly norms regulating the power of state agents to agree to
treaties on behalf of a state.7 ' The law of treaties requires that, for
a state to be bound by a treaty obligation, the state's agent must
either: (1) be vested with an unrestrained ability to act on behalf
of the state ("plenipotence" or "plein pouvoir"); or (2) be
empowered to act through a recognized course of dealing between
states (in which case an agent's authority is evidenced by past
dealings with the foreign state).8
°
Accordingly, in the ERP context, consent to violate
sovereignty must be given by an agent with appropriate powers to
grant such consent.1 A serious question therefore arises as to
whether assurances given by members of foreign intelligence
agencies are legally adequate to grant such consent.8
Many scholars assert that, even if the territorial state did not
give valid consent to a sovereignty violation, the fact that an ERP
arrest violated international law has no bearing on the
adjudication of the suspect." To support this contention, some
scholars recall the non-inquiry doctrine, or rule of male captus
bene detentus.4 According to this doctrine, domestic criminal
courts may not ascertain whether the circumstances of the arrest
78. See id; see also MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 707 (5th ed. 2003)
("wrongfulness is precluded provided that the act is within the limits of the consent
given").
79. In particular, "[w]ho has authority to consent... depend[s] on the rule," and with
respect of consent's coercion, error or fraud, "the principles concerning the validity of
consent to treaties provide relevant guidance." JAMES CRAWFORD, THE INTERNATIONAL
LAW COMMISSION'S ARTICLE ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY 164 (2002).
80. See Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties art. 7(1)(a)-(b), May 23, 1969, 115
U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
81. See id.
82. Take, for instance, the case of Abu Omar, where CIA agents acted with the
complicity of the director of the SISMI (the Italian Secret Service), Niccol6 Pollari.
Whether Pollari is responsible for complicity in kidnapping Abu Omar will presumably be
ascertained by the judges in Milan. The extent to which Pollari consented to the CIA's
action may be relevant for settling the problem of whether Italian authorities consented to
the action itself. See generally Salvini's Order, supra note 38. Certainly Pollari has no
powers to sign agreements with foreign secret agents; neither international practice nor
prior U.S.-Italy relations suggests otherwise.
83. See Kash, supra note 48, at 144.
84. Id.; see also Silvia Borelli, The Rendition of Terrorist Suspects to the United States:
Human Rights and the Limits of International Cooperation, in ENFORCING
INTERNATIONAL LAW NORMS AGAINST TERRORISM 331, 353-62 (Andrea Bianchi ed.,
2004).
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violated international law." In other words, the power of a
domestic court to adjudicate the case is not affected by
circumstances which reveal that the government acted illegally.
Scholars rely on well-established jurisprudence in arguing that
ERP arrests and subsequent trials remain. legal, despite any
violation of international law that may have been involved in the
suspect's capture.' A few notable cases underscore this point of
view,' including: Ker,' Frisbie,' Eichmann, Argoud,9' and the
recent U.S. decision in the case of Alvarez-Machain. *
It is the opinion of this author, however, that any reliance on
male captus must be rejected. First, there is some confusion
surrounding the male captus rule because its supporting precedents
are often misunderstood or misapplied." As one scholar phrased
this problem of application, "the courts of the world have ... failed
the decisive question[, which] ... is not whether jurisdiction exists,
but whether jurisdiction should be exercised."9 Reassuringly, there
is a recent trend in domestic courts to overrule such precedent.
85. Borelli, supra note 84, at 353-62.
86. Indeed, "[w]ith rare unanimity and undeniable justification, the courts of the
world have held that the manner in which an accused has been brought before a court
does not and, indeed cannot deprive it of its jurisdiction." Frederick Alexander Mann,
Reflections on the Prosecution of Persons Abducted in Breach of International Law, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW AT A TIME OF PERPLEXITY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF SHABTAI
ROSENNE 407,414 (Yoram Dinstein ed., 1988).
87. Id.
88. See Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886).
89. See Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952).
90. See Att'y-Gen. of the Gov't of Israel v. Adolf Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 5 (S. Ct. 1962)
(Isr.).
91. See Re Argoud, 45 I.L.R. 90 (Cass. Crim. 1964) (Fr.), reprinted in 92 JOURNAL DU
DROIT INTERNATIONAL 93 (1965) (Fr.).
92. See United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 673 (1992).
93. Borelli, supra note 84, at 361. Notably, the principle of male captus bene detentus
is applied where the jurisdiction of a domestic court is contested. Id.
94. Mann, supra note 86, at 414.
95. In some cases, for instance, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia (ICTY) has affirmed that the illegality of the arrest generally does affect the
Court's jurisdiction, but the trial can nevertheless be validly initiated if the violations of
the accused's rights have not been "of such an egregious nature." Prosecutor v. Nikolic,
Case No. IT-94-2-PT, Decision on Defence Motion Challenging the Exercise of
Jurisdiction by the Tribunal, 114 (Oct. 9, 2002); see also Prosecutor v. Dokmanovic, Case
No. IT-95-13a-PT, Decision on the Motion for Release by the Accused (Oct. 22, 1997)
(distinguishing between "luring" and "kidnapping," only the latter raising issues related to
jurisdiction); Aparna Sridhar, The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia's Response to the Problem of Transnational Abduction, 42 STAN. J. INT'L L.
343, 355 (2006); Michael P. Scharf, The Prosecutor v. Slavko Dokmanovic: Irregular
Rendition and the ICTY, 11 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 369,379-81 (1998).
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Specifically, domestic courts have attempted to analyze
jurisdiction in..rendition cases under the treaty norms of
extradition, holding that the legality of an arrest does affect
jurisdiction.' In this vein, courts have exercised their supervisory
power to reject the domestic prosecution of an accused if he or she
has been forcibly abducted from another national jurisdiction with
the aid of the government.
Second, and more generally, the ERP must be distinguished
from the legal environment in which the male captus rule emerged.
The male captus rule emerged in criminal trials against the
kidnapped person,98 while the ERP's exclusive purpose is the pre-
adjudicatory step of interrogation.99 No criminal trial is initiated,
no criminal charges are brought against the abducted person, and
as a general matter, instruments of criminal law are avoided.'" It is,
as mentioned above, the paradigm of "adaptation.'.'.
Third, it must be emphasized that mere adjudication of an
abducted criminal does not legitimize a violation of human rights
law,"° even when the operation occurs with the approval of a
96. Borelli, supra note 84, at 346 (noting that an emerging body of jurisprudence
suggests that when an accused has been forcibly abducted from another national
jurisdiction - particularly if the abduction was done with the aid of the same government
that subsequently seeks to prosecute him - a court may exercise its supervisory authority
and decline to try the accused); see also Connelly v. Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions, [1964] 3 All
E.R. 510 (A.C.) (Eng.); Dir. of Pub. Prosecutors v. Humphreys, (1976) 2 All E.R. 497
(Eng.).
97. Borelli, supra note 84, at 355.
98. See id. at 353-55.
99. See 'Renditions Save Lives': Condoleezza Rice's Full Statement, supra note 58.
100. To be sure, "[n]one of the current estimated 3,000 captives were charged with
recognizable criminal offense ...." John Fitzpatrick, Rendition and Transfer in the War
Against Terrorism: Guantanamo and Beyond, .25 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 457,
460 (2003).
101. See 'Renditions Save Lives': Condoleezza Rice's Full Statement, supra note 58.
102. See Borelli, supra note 84, at 356 (arguing that "with the development of
international human rights law, the issue of forcible abduction can be framed in ways
other than the traditional issue of inter-State responsibility"); see also Royal J. Stark, The
Ker-Frisbie-Alvarez Doctrine: International Law, Due Process, and United States
Sponsored Kidnapping of Foreign National Abroad, 9 CONN. J. INT'L L. 113, 134 (1999)
(demonstrating that the Ker-Frisbie doctrine "cannot be reconciled with the Supreme
Court's expansion of the concept of due process, which now protects the accused against
pretrial illegality by denying the government the fruit of its exploitation of any deliberate
and unnecessary lawlessness on its part..."). In support of his argument, Stark mentions
United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974), and Cook v. United States, 288 U.S.
102 (1933), as examples where U.S. courts refused to refer to Ker and established that
jurisdiction on specific cases depended on the government's *previous misconduct with
regard to the accused's abduction. Stark, supra, at 134. Remarkably, in Toscanino, the
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territorial state. 3 In particular, forced abduction is clearly an
arbitrary deprivation of freedom, and is thus incompatible with the
international norms that affirm an individual's right to freedom."
To be sure, there exist multiple international treaties °" and norms
which expressly forbid international abduction." Recently, the UN
General Assembly sponsored a global convention on the topic of
forced disappearance, which concluded on December 20, 2006.'07
Forced disappearance
places the persons subjected thereto outside the protection of
the law and inflicts severe suffering on them and their families.
It constitutes a violation of ... the right to recognition as a
person before the law, the right to liberty and security of a
federal court recalls Article 2(4) of the UN Charter and Article 17 of the Charter of the
Organization of American States [OAS], and concludes that the territory of a member
state "may not be the object ... of measures of force taken by another state, directly or
indirectly, on any grounds whatever." Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 277.
103. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 56, at 256 (noting that, given the asylum state's
consent, "such a practice would.., not disrupt relations between the respective states nor
it would involve infringement of sovereignty") Human rights issues and constitutional
issues would still remain. Id.
104. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [ICCPR] art. 9(1), Mar.
23, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 ("No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention"
and "[n]o one shall be deprived of his liberty except of such grounds and in accordance
with such procedure as are established by law.").
105. See, e.g., Rome Statue of the International Criminal Court art. 7(l)(i), July 17,
1998, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9*; see also Antonio Cassese, Crimes Against Humanity, in
THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 353,
374 (Antonio Cassese et al. eds., 2002); Paola Gaeta, Extraordinary Renditions e immunita
dalla giurisdizione penale degli agenti di Stati esteri: il caso Abu Omar [Extraordinary
Renditions and Immunity of State Agents from Criminal Jurisdiction: the Abu Omar
case], 89 RIVISTA DI DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE 126, 129 (2006); Inter-American
Convention on the Forced Disappearance of Persons, June 9, 1994, OAS Doc.
OEA/Ser.P/AG/Doc. 3114/94 (1994), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1529, 1529-33; Reed Brody &
Felipe GonzAles, Nunca Mds: An Analysis of International Instruments on
"Disappearances," 19 HUM. RTS. Q. 365, 376-77 (1997).
106. See Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance,
G.A. Res. 47/133, Preamble, U.N. Doc. AfRES/47/133 (Dec. 18, 1992) (declaring that
"enforced disappearance undermines the deepest values of any society committed to
respect for the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms, and that the
systematic practice of such acts is of the nature of a crime against humanity").
107. International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced
Disappearance, G.A. Res. 61/177, U.N. Doc. AIRES/61/177 (Jan. 12, 2007). Fifty-seven
states signed the Convention. Id. Article 1 states that "[n]o one shall be subjected to
enforced disappearance." Id. art. 1(1). However, the convention also states that
exceptional circumstances, whether they be war, threat of war, internal political instability,
or any other public emergency, "may be invoked as a justification for enforced
disappearance." Id. art. 1(2).
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person and the right not to be subjected to torture and other
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment....
For these reasons, the reference to both the territorial state's
consent and the male captus rule as a means to uphold the legality
of suspected terrorist adbuctions are highly questionable in the
ERP context. The male captus rule is perfectly adaptable to the
violation of sovereignty, but it can hardly be applied to human
rights violations. Human rights violations were actually ignored in
the cases cited above. Generally, such rule raises doubts from a
moral viewpoint, since "[s]ociety is the ultimate loser when, in
order to convict the guilty, it uses methods that lead to decreased
respect for the law. 1 °9 Abduction is a per se violation of
international law. Accordingly, Condoleezza Rice's claim that
consent of the territorial state shows sufficient respect for
international law is extremely naive.
B. Assessing the Risk of Torture
1. A Very Absolute Ban
As mentioned supra, the second component of the ERP is the
moving of a suspected terrorist to a country that practices torture
for interrogation. Torture is unquestionably illegal under
international law." Indeed, its prohibition is provided by a norm
of jus cogens,il making it non-derogable and unjustifiable under all
circumstances.
11 2
108. Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance,
supra note 106, art. 1(2).
109. United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 274 (2d Cir. 1974).
110. See, e.g., United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment [CAT], art. 2, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85
(entered into force on June 26, 1987); European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms [ECHR], Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (entered into
force Sept. 3, 1953) (stating that "[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment"); European Convention for the Prevention of
Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Nov. 26, 1987, Europ. T.S.
No. 126 (establishing a monitoring mechanism based on visit).
111. See Prosecutor v. Furundzjia, Case No. IT-95-17/1, Judgment, 153 (Dec. 10,
1998), reprinted in 38 I.L.M. 349 (1999) (emphasizing that "[b]ecause of the importance of
the values [the principle proscribing torture] protects, this principle has evolved into a
peremptory norm or jus cogens, that is, a norm that enjoys a higher rank in the
international hierarchy than treaty law and even 'ordinary' customary rules"). Usually
norms of jus cogens prevail on all other norms of international law. See Vienna
Convention, supra note 80, art. 53 ("[a] treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it
conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law"). Although the general
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The main problem with such a principle is that it calls for
states to enact "effective legislative, administrative, judicial or
other measures to prevent torture.""' 3 Clearly, prevention is
essential if human dignity is to be preserved at the global level.
The sovereignty of states, however, severely limits any attempt to
prevent torture because states cannot extend their efforts to the
territories of other countries.
International law addresses this problem by regulating cases
where individuals under the control of one state face the risk of
torture if moved to another state."' Article 3(1) of the Convention
Against Torture (CAT) states that "[n]o State Party shall expel,
return (refouler) or extradite a person to another state when there
are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of
being subjected to torture.. 15 This norm establishes that the
authorities deciding whether to allow a transfer have an obligation
to refuse the transfer if there is a risk of torture in the country of
destination. "6
A question may arise about the meaning of the word "return"
- in French, "refouler." While it is clear that the norm applies to
expulsion and extradition proceedings, it also seems .to
contemplate the simple "turn[ing] back" of an immigrant."7 The
principle considers conflicting norms void, the solution applied in practice deems the
norms of treaties which are inconsistent with jus cogens to be simply unoperative or
unenforceable. Id. Extradition treaties are an example of this - the duty to extradite under
a treaty cannot be enforced incompatibly with the prohibition of torture, even though the
treaty still remains operative and enforceable. Erika De Wet, The Prohibition of Torture
as an International Norm of jus cogens and Its Implications for National and Customary
Law, 15 EUR. J. INT'L L. 97, 101-12 (2004).
112. As to Article 3 of the ECHR, supra note 110, scholars note that "only in this
article are. there no qualifications or exceptions, and no restrictions to the rights
guaranteed. The prohibition is absolute." CLARE OVEY & ROBIN WHITE, JACOBS AND
WHITE, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 58 (3d ed. 2002); see also
JOHN COOPER, CRUELTY: AN ANALYSIS OF ARTICLE 3, at 9 (2003). In Chahal, the
ECHR dealt with the deportation of a Sikh separatist from the United Kingdom to India,
where he was threatened with torture. Chahal v. United Kingdom, 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. 413
(1996). The British government argued that he was a dangerous terrorist and his expulsion
was required for the security of English citizens. Id. Interestingly, the Court pointed out
that "even in these circumstances, the Convention prohibits in absolute terms torture."
Id. 79; see also Soering v. U.K., 11 Eur. Ct. H.R. 439 (ser. A) (1989).
113. CAT, supra note 110, art. 2(1) (emphasis added).
114. Id. art. 3(1).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. The proper translation of the French word "refouler" is to force back, to push
back, "to turn back [immigrant] ...to reject [candidate]." THE OXFORD-HACHETrE
FRENCH DICTIONARY 719 (3d ed. 2001).
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term "refouler," however, which sparked animated debate during
the CAT negotiations,1"8 usually refers to the case of an individual
who presents himself at the border."9 Thus, Article 3(1) might not
apply when the refoulement occurs outside the territory of the host
country.
Some scholars and U.S. officials strongly believe that these
doubts are well-grounded and that the CAT does not extend
extraterritorially."2 ° In support of this argument, one scholar cites
the 1993 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Sale v. Haitian Centers
Council.2' The Court's conclusion was that U.S. agents acting
abroad have no restraints in transferring individuals to other
countries, even when these individuals face the risk of being
tortured.'22
Before challenging this interpretation, one should recall
Article 3(2) of the CAT. While Article 3(1) forbids the extradition,
expulsion, or deportation of a person only when there are
"substantial grounds" to believe he or she would face torture, 3
Article 3(2) addresses the problem of determining when such a
threshold is met:
For the purpose of determining whether there are such grounds,
the competent authorities shall take into account all relevant
considerations including, where applicable, the existence in the
118. See J. HERMAN BURGERS & HANS DANELIUS, THE UNITED NATIONS
CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE: A HANDBOOK ON THE CONVENTION AGAINST
TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR
PUNISHMENT 50 (noticing that, during negotiations, "it was said that there were strong
humanitarian reasons to include [the] word ['return' ('refouler')], which broadened the
protection of the persons concerned").
119. See, e.g., Sale v. Haitian Ctr. Council Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 181-82 (1993).
120. See John Yoo, Transferring Terrorists, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1183, 1229 (2004)
("the [CAT] is generally inapplicable to transfers effected in the context of the current
armed conflict because it has no extraterritorial effect (except in case of extradition) and,
hence, cannot apply to Al Qaeda and Taliban prisoners detained outside the U.S.
territory" (italics omitted)); see also Radsan, supra note 29, at 21 (assuming, but not
explaining, that "CAT's territorial reach is limited"). According to John Bellinger, Legal
Advisor to the U.S. Department of State, "[t]he United States has long taken the position
that [Article 3 of the CAT] applies to people expelled or returned from the United States
and we're very careful about that obligation. It does not apply, though, to a transfer that
takes place wholly outside of the United States, because that's not a return or an
expulsion." John Bellinger, Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep't of State, On-The-Record Briefing
on the Committee Against Torture Report, May 19, 2006 [hereinafter Bellinger Briefing],
available-at http://www.state.gov/s/l/rls/66519.htm.
121. Yoo, supra note 120, at 1229 (citing Sale, 509 U.S. at 179-83).
122. Sale, 509 U.S. at 155.
123. CAT, supra note 110, art. 3(1).
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State concerned of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or
mass violations of human rights.Y
This norm apparently establishes the conditions under which
competent authorities must decide when extradition, expulsion, or
deportation should be forbidden. 5 More precisely, it establishes
that: (1) "it is illegal to disregard any information about the
likelihood of torture;"'26 and (2) all circumstances must be taken
into account, particularly whether gross violations of human rights
were perpetrated by the state." Besides these indications,
however, Article 3(2) does not contain any other criteria to guide
the assessment of the likelihood of torture with regard to
extradition, expulsion, or deportation proceedings.
Nevertheless, some guidelines can be extrapolated from
Article 3(2). First, the individual does not have to prove that he or
she would be subject to torture. 9 It is enough for him or her to
show that there are systematic violations of human rights in the
destination state, because, generally, "where systematic violations
of human rights take place, it is highly likely that torture takes
place as well.' 3° This presumption favors the applicant.3 Second,
for obvious reasons, states normally refrain from expressly
declaring their direct involvement in torture cases. Thus, it is
unlikely that an applicant will find strong evidence of torture in the
recipient country. As a result, CAT does not require a high burden
of proof of the truthfulness of the facts concerning torture.32
This author takes the position that the standards provided by
Article 3 of the CAT apply to ERP actions. First, it is the author's
belief that the denial of the CAT's extraterritorial reach is a
product of a patent misunderstanding. It is correct to argue that if
Article 3 forbids certain transfers for regular proceedings, such as
expulsion or extradition, it must a fortiori oversee irregular
124. Id. art. 3(2).
125. Id.
126. Hawkins, supra note 28, at 229.
127. Id. at 230.
128. CAT, supra note 110, art. 3(2).
129. Id.
130. Matteo Fornari, La Convenzione delle Nazioni Unite contro la tortura e altre pene
o trattamenti crudeli, inumani o degradanti, in LA TUTELA INTERNAZIONALE DEI DIRlThI
UMANI 203, 211 (Laura Pineschi ed., 2006) ("laddove si verifichino sistematiche violazioni
dei diritti umani, [ ] altamente probabile il compimento di atti di tortura") (Italy).
131. Id.
132. See BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 118, at 127.
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proceedings.33 Clearly, Article 3's aim is to prevent torture, '
where the expulsion, extradition, or return proceedings are
exhausted. Without Article 3, the expelling state party would
hardly be held responsible for torture, and the individual,
nevertheless, would have been tortured. Sale does not affect this
because it concerned Article 33 of the UN Protocol on the status
of refugees, a norm that's scope is clearly distinct from Article 3 of
the CAT.13 1 Moreover, in Furundzjia, the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) determined that the
prohibition of torture as an absolute value applies to all individuals
over whom states wield authority, regardless of any jurisdictional
issues.'36 The ICTY could have chosen to proscribe torture against
all individuals within the jurisdiction of a state, but instead
explicitly chose the broader prohibition.'37 The CAT, accordingly,
applies extraterritorially to the extent to which a state claims
authority over an individual outside its territory.18 A very strange
legal system would be the one that forbade questionable conduct
in an unconditional way, and then condoned the same conduct as
an extraterritorial exception.
Second, it is a matter of fact that the recipient countries are
always the same: Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Uzbekistan, Morocco,
Pakistan, and, very recently, Ethiopia and Somalia. " Several
official reports of the U.S. government have denounced these
countries, most of which are guilty of both torture and massive
133. "[llnternational human rights law is equally applicable to cases of
expulsion/deportation as it is to regular extradition; it is arguably even more important in
protecting individual rights in cases of irregular rendition." Borelli, supra note 84, at 339.
134. "[T]he main aim and purpose of the Convention is to prevent torture, and not to
redress torture once it has occurred." U.N. Comm. Against Torture, Communication
21/1995, Alan v. Switzerland, [ 11.5, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/16/D/41/1996, Jan. 31, 1995.
135. "[T]he scope of the two provisions is different. In the Refugee Convention,
protection is given to refugees, i.e. to persons who are persecuted in their country of origin
for a special reason, whereas article 3 of the [CAT] applies to any person who, for
whatever cause, is in danger of being subjected to torture if handed over to another
country." BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 118, at 125. It should be noted that the
authors refer to Article 33 of the Refugee Convention, which is similar to Article 33 of the
U.N. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.
136. Prosecutor v. Furundzjia, Case No. IT-95-17/1, Judgment, 1 154 (Dec. 10, 1998),
reprinted in 38 I.L.M. 349 (1999).
137. Id.
138. CAT, supra note 110, art. 3.
139. See Anthony Mitchell, Ethiopia Secret Prisons Under Scrutiny, BOSTON.COM,
Apr. 5, 2007, http://www.boston.com/news/world/europe/articles/2007/04/05/ethiopia-
secret-prisons underscrutiny/.
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violations of human rights.'"" Pursuant to the requirements of
Article 3(2) of the CAT,' it is inexplicable that the U.S.
government ignored evidence that there were substantial grounds
for believing that rendered individuals would be tortured in the
recipient countries. It should have been clear to the government
that all the abducted individuals could be subjected to torture if
sent to the aforementioned countries a fortiori under the U.S.
.Senate's notorious interpretation of Article 3(2) of the CAT.'2 It is
disingenuous for the U.S. government to avoid its responsibilities
under CAT by claiming that the ERP does not involve torture on
the part of the CIA agents who perform abductions, when clearly
abduction is prerequisite to rendition of the impacted individuals
to a recipient country. '
2. Conflicting Obligations
Another aspect that appears relevant to the present analysis is
the relationship between the ERP and other international
obligations which concern the fight against terrorism. Two points
are relevant to this inquiry. First, it is important to determine
whether rendition remains a violation of international law, even
though local authorities complied, with certain other international
legal obligations regarding the fight against terrorism. Second, it is
140. See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of State, Egypt: Country Report on Human Rights Practice -
2004, Feb. 28, 2005, available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41720.htm
(stating that "[t]he security forces continued to mistreat and torture prisoners," and
"[rleports of torture and mistreatment at police stations remained frequent").
141. CAT, supra note 110, art. 3(2).
142. Eligibility for Withholding of Removal Under the Convention Against Torture, 8
C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2) (2007).
143. See Radsan, supra note 29, at 19. In all the cases cited in this article, "the grounds
for believing that someone will be tortured are close to 100%." Id. It seems, however, that
CAT Article 3(2) allows at least one case in which the violation of that norm could be
excused: when the sender state has no reasons to believe that torture will take place
because of the strong assurances given by the recipient state. CAT, supra note 110, art.
3(2). Indeed, diplomatic assurances might make the sender state reasonably believe that
the individual concerned will not be tortured, and if torture still occurs, then the sender
state is not held responsible. This perspective is problematic. Since the aim of CAT's
Article 3 is to prevent torture, it seems unlikely that the state could justify its conduct by
relying on diplomatic assurances from a country that is reported to have committed gross
violations of human rights. Of course, if torture takes place despite diplomatic assurances,
the sender state would thereafter be proscribed from relying on any future assurances
provided by the implicated recipient state. Yet, what future do human rights have if all the
world's states send at least one individual to Egypt under the latter's diplomatic
assurances? What is the sense of legitimizing a legal framework which condones
systematic torture under the cover that diplomatic assurances were provided?
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important to evaluate the persuasive authority which supports the
argument that the ERP violates norms on extradition of suspected
terrorists.
The Committee Against Torture addressed this first issue in.
Agiza in 2005.'4 In this case, the Committee evaluated the
rendition of Agiza, a known terrorist, by SAPO to Egypt in 2001
via a CIA flight.4 1 Sweden argued that the action was a part of its
national effort to comply with the obligations deriving from UN
Security Council Resolution 1373.'46 In particular, the government
emphasized that, according to Resolution 1373, states must
prevent terrorists from exploiting the institution of asylum.'47 The
Committee responded by noting that
measures taken to fight terrorism, including denial of safe'
haven, deriving from binding Security Council Resolutions are
both legitimate and important. Their execution, however, must
be carried out with full respect to the applicable rules of
international law, including the provisions of the [CAT].
48
Stated differently, even if Security Council resolutions are
deemed to prevail over all other international obligations,
according to Article 103 of the UN Charter,' the ban on torture
established by the CAT is so strong that it may not be overridden
by any other UN norm when rendition of an individual to a
recipient country may result in torture."' Under these
circumstances, the explanation lies in the hierarchy of
international law. Even though a subsequent agreement regarding
the rendition" of a particular individual concluded by the
144. U.N. Comm. Against Torture, Communication 233/2003, U.N. Doc.
CATC/34/D23312003 (May 20, 2005) (deciding the complaint submitted by Ahmed
Hussein Mustafa Kamil Agiza against Sweden under article 22 of the CAT), available at
http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/cat/decisions/233-2003.html.
145. Id.
146. See S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001).
147. U.N. Committee Against Torture, Communication 233/03, supra note 144, 7 4.9
(noting that Resolution 1373 "called upon Member States to ensure, in accordance with
international law, that the institution of refugee status is not abused by perpetrators,
organizers or facilitators of terrorist acts").
148. Id. 13.1.
149. U.N. Charter art. 103 ("[i]n the event of a conflict between the obligations of the
Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any
other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail").
150. It should be noted that this Article does not review the controversial issue of
balancing human rights obligations with the UN framework of resolutions concerning the
fight against terrorism.
[Vol. 30:33
2008] Reactions to the United States Rendition Program 55
intelligence agencies of a concerned country can overrule a treaty
on cooperation or extradition,"' the norms of jus cogens are
mandatory and cannot be derogated by the states. The rights
affirmed as jus cogens are not waivable; states cannot exploit the
consent of those rights in order to justify a violation of jus cogens.153
Moreover, the argument that Resolution 1373 justifies such actions
is very reductive. Resolution 1373 does not authorize states to
kidnap individuals and torture them.'5 Furthermore, it would be
dishonest to interpret its norms as a justification for violating the
jus cogens provision contained in Article 3 of the CAT.
In addressing the second question of whether the ERP
violates the norms on extradition, one wonders what is so
problematic with developing an alternate system to extradition.
Why should the ERP not be intended as a means of rendition that
is an "alternative" to the one provided by extradition treaties? The
answer is very simple: "[e]xtralegal remedies to extradition ...
invariably pose a threat to international peace and security."1"' Of
course, not all of the remedies held outside the framework of a
treaty are automatically illegal. For example, some extralegal
remedies could be justified as countermeasures. "6 This argument,
however, is tenuous at best.
151. This author agrees with Professor Bassiouni's argument regarding rendition
accidents, which states that "[t]he solution ...should be to make extradition more
efficient, not to subvert it by resorting to unlawful or legally questionable means."
BASSIOUNI, supra note 56, at 251. In the view of this author, however, the problem is
political. Legally speaking, there is no issue when a state party to an extradition treaty
derogates from the treaty with the consent of the other state party. A different solution
would be settled in case the territorial state did not consent to the operation. Here, absent
the approval of the territorial state, no legal agreement can be construed as to supersede
the previous one, which remains valid. Furthermore, the abduction is clearly a breach of
the valid treaty.
152. Id.
153. See Case T-306/01, Ahmed Ali Yusuf v. Council, 2005 E.C.R. 11-3533, 278-80.
154. See S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 146.
155. BARBARA M. YARNOLD, INTERNATIONAL FUGITIVES: A NEW ROLE FOR THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 69-70 (1991) ("[e]xtralegal methods of extradition
may also endanger the national and international rights of criminal defendants").
156. Under international law, countermeasures are reactions (or, juridically speaking,
"legitimate reprisals") brought by a State which has been harmed by another State's
conduct. Generally, countermeasures are illegal if brought out of the requirements
established by international law. One of these requirements is that countermeasures must
be "taken in response to a previous international wrongful act of another State and ...
directed against that State." Gabkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J.
7, 83 (Sept. 25). Those limits explain why international law cannot justify the abductions
of aliens. First, one should determine which norm has been breached. This cannot be the
norm on cooperation against terrorism, or the principle of aut dedere aut judicare, because
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Nevertheless, ERP actions are illegal if they are inconsistent
with treaty provisions, i.e., they are "contrary to the treaty right[s].
of another State.'. 7 Where extradition treaties require substantive
or procedural guarantees for extradition proceedings or a
minimum standard of treatment for the detainee, abductions
clearly constitute a breach of treaty norms. "'8 In the U.S. Supreme
Court's dissenting opinion in Alvarez-Machain, Justice Stevens,
joined by Justices Blackmun and O'Connor, correctly stressed
that:
[t]he Government's claim that the Treaty is not exclusive, but
permits forcible governmental kidnapping, would transform
these, and other, provisions into little more than verbiage...
[Indeed, i]t is shocking that a party to an extradition treaty
might believe that it has secretly reserved the right to make
seizures of citizens in the other party's territory. 9
In Alvarez-Machain, the U.S. government claimed that the
extradition treaty between the United States and Mexico was not
exclusive, but that extradition was only an "optional method of
obtaining jurisdiction over alleged offenders."'" Although the
majority agreed with this perspective, their viewpoint was
incorrect. States go through the effort of negotiating and
stipulating complex international treaties in order to set a legal
framework for their cooperation.'61 They assess a duty to extradite
because the territorial state's consent is essential to the continued
peaceful cohabitation of sovereign entities.'62 If states could freely
kidnap people everywhere, whywould they stipulate hundreds of
usually the States that kidnap alleged terrorists are cooperative countries (e.g. Italy,
Sweden, Pakistan, and Bosnia-Herzegovina). Indeed in some of those countries, criminal
proceedings were already ongoing (as was the true in the cases of Abu Omar and
Boumediene). Second, "[c]ountermeasures shall not affect . . . obligations for the
protection of fundamental human rights." Draft Articles, supra note 76, at 333. Clearly,
such countermeasures would drastically affect the individual right to be free from arbitrary
detention. Third, before taking countermeasures, the State must fulfill some obligation,
such as the request of negotiations and the call for halting the violation, something which
hardly occurs in the ERP cases. Id. at 345. For all these reasons, ERP actions could be
justified as countermeasures under international law.
157. CRAWFORD, supra note 79, at 83; Draft Articles, supra note 76, at 68.
158. See Nicoletta Parisi, Brief Remarks on Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters
and the Rights of Individual and Domestic Praxis, 3 STUDI DI DIRirIro INTERNAZIONALE
IN ONORE DI GAETANO ARANGIO-RUIZ 2081,2103 (2004).
159. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 673-79 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
160. Id. at 674 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
161. Id. at 675 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
162. Id. at 681 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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treaties on extradition and cooperation in criminal matters? The
extradition process might be time-consuming but it is,
nevertheless, efficient. While abductions are life-threatening and
inhumane by definition, supporters note that "extradition[s] have
yet to kill anyone."'63 Rather than legitimizing other techniques of
capturing suspected terrorists, the Security Council has
strengthened its stance against terrorism after 9/11 by calling upon
states to better cooperate with one another. "
Certainly, "[t]he integrity of the internationally recognized
process of extradition should not be subverted for practical
considerations ... [and] alternative devices to extradition should
not be allowed.""16 The presumption that the ERP saves lives is
highly questionable. Unlike the extradition processes, the ERP
seems to deeply affect human dignity, to undermine international
relations, and, as discussed below, to challenge government
supremacy in foreign policy.
IV. How THE ERP IS UNDERMINING INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
A. Foreign policy and the courts
Traditionally, domestic courts have little room to question a
government's maneuvers in its relations with other states. The
ERP, however, has broken with this classical picture of domestic
constitutional structure."M Because foreign policy remains a strict
prerogative of the executive branch in most constitutional systems
- with some intervention by Parliament - the courts' interference
with ERP cases is likely to raise serious questions of domestic
legitimacy within the United States as well as in all other
concerned countries. Several examples are illustrative.
163. GEOFF GILBERT, TRANSNATIONAL FUGITIVE OFFENDERS IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW: EXTRADITION AND OTHER MECHANISMS 361 (1998). •
164. See S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 146; see also Borelli, supra note 84, at 363
("[i]nternational cooperation is therefore... a viable alternative to abduction").
165. BASSIOUNI, supra note 56, at 310-11; see also SATYADEVA BEDI, EXTRADITION:
A TREATISE ON THE LAWS RELEVANT TO THE FUGITIVE OFFENDERS WITHIN AND
WITH THE COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES 396 (2002); GILBERT, supra note 163, at 375-76
(proposing a framework of new rules on abduction, regulated by a treaty whose violation
would divest domestic courts of jurisdiction).
166. See, e.g., Abu Omar, Rinvio a Giudizio per Pollari, CORRIERE DELLA SERA, Feb.
17, 2007 (Italy), translated in Adrian Trevisan, Ex-Intelligence Chief, CIA Agents Indicted
for Kidnapping, WATCHING AMERICA, Feb. 17, 2007, http://watchingamerica.com/
corrieredellasera0O0021.shtml.
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First, consider the Abu Omar case. Apparently, the CIA
agents acted with the placet of the Italian secret service, the
SISMI.67 Some SISMI members, including a director, were
indicted for the -abduction
The Italian government strongly opposed any declassification
of the information related to the incident, and appealed the release
of classified information to the Constitutional Court.6 9 The judge,
however, denied the appeal, and allowed the case to go to trial. 7
Furthermore, while the Italian penal code provides for trial in
absentia,7' the arrest warrant issued by the Milan Court is valid
throughout the entire European Union, pursuant to the so-called
"European arrest warrant" approved in 2002,172 despite the fact
that many European countries do not support a trial in absentia."'
Second, in the El-Masri case, both the Federal District Court
of East Virginia17 ' and the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
determined that the state secret privilege applied to discovery
sought by plaintiff and consequently dismissed the case.
According to the appellate court, details of the ERP must remain
secret because the interests of U.S. national security so require."
Nevertheless, the German authorities initiated investigations
about El-Masri's abduction.77 In late January 2007, a criminal
court in Minich issued an arrest warrant for several CIA agents
supposedly involved in the incident.7 7 Reportedly, the Frankfurt
airport and the U.S. airbase at Ramstein had been used for flights
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. See id. The Italian government argued before the constitutional court that the
judges in Milan "overstepped their powers by violating laws against the release of state
secrets in the investigation of the kidnapping of Abu Omar." Id.
170. Id.
171. CODICE DI PROCEDURA PENALE [C.P.P] art. 420-quater (Italy).
172. See Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA, European Arrest Warrant and
the Surrender Procedures Between Member States, art. 1(1), 1(2), 2002 O.J. (L 190).
173. Mark Lander, German Court Confronts U.S. on Abduction, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1,
2007, at Al.
174. El-Masri v. Tenet [EI-Masri I], 437 F. Supp. 2d 530, 537 (E.D. Va. 2006) ("any
admission or denial . . .in this case would reveal the means and methods employed
pursuant to this clandestine program and such revelation would present a grave risk of
injury to national security"); see also id. at 539 ("any answer to the complaint by the
defendants risks the disclosure of specific details about the rendition argument").
175. El-Masri v. United States [EI-Masri II], 479 F.3d. 296 (4th Cir. 2007).
176. See id.
177. Id. at 300. It should be noted that el-Masri is a German citizen.
178. Lander, supra note 173, at Al.
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associated with the ERP.'79 Like the Italian arrest warrant, the
German warrant is valid in all European states.
Third, in the Arar case, the Canadian policy against terrorism
received a strong and polemic rebuff by an ad hoc commission,
elected by the Canadian legislature and presided over by Justice
Dennis O'Connor (Arar Commission)."' The Arar Commission
was required to inquire into the factual circumstances of Arar's
deportation to Syria, and to recommend potential reforms for the
Canadian security services. The Arar Commission issued a total
of four reports, '83 and ultimately recommended, among other
things: (1) the rigorous separation of the intelligence agencies
from those of law-enforcement, like the Royal Canadian Mounted
Police (RCMP);'" (2) a strengthening of the cooperation and
information-sharing process both within and between the
intelligence and law enforcement agencies; "  and (3) the
introduction of "clearly established policies respecting screening
for relevance, reliability and accuracy and . . . relevant laws
179. Id.
180. See Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA, supra note 172.
181. See generally, Comm'n of Inquiry into the Actions of Can. Officials in Relation to
Maher Arar [Arar Comm'n], About the Inquiry, http://www.ararcommission.ca (last
visited Sept. 13, 2007), available at http://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/206/301/pco-bcp/
commissions/maherarar/07-09-13/www.ararcommission.ca/eng/index.htm.
182. ARAR COMM'N, REPORT OF THE EVENTS RELATING TO MAHER ARAR:
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 12 (2006) [hereinafter ARAR COMM'N, ANALYSIS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS], available at http://www.ararcommission.ca/eng
AR_- English.pdf.
183. As to the factual investigation, the Arar Commission issued several reports,
including one entitled "Analysis and Recommendations," and two separate volumes of
factual background information, entitled "Factual Background - Vol. I" and "Factual
Background - Vol. II," respectively. ARAR COMM'N: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 182; see also ARAR COMM'N, REPORT OF THE EVENTS
RELATING TO MAHER ARAR: FACTUAL BACKGROUND - VOL. I (2006) [hereinafter
ARAR COMM'N, FACTUAL BACKGROUND - VOL. I], available at
http://www.ararcommission.ca/eng/Vol-l-English.pdf; ARAR COMM'N, REPORT OF THE
EVENTS RELATING TO MAHER ARAR: FACTUAL BACKGROUND - VOL. II (2006)
[hereinafter ARAR COMM'N, FACTUAL BACKGROUND - VOL. II], available at
http://www.ararcommission.ca/eng/Yol-II-English.pdf. A fourth and final report,
published on Dec. 12, 2006, concludes the investigation with a series of recommendations
to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police [RCMP]. ARAR COMM'N, A NEW REVIEW
MECHANISM FOR THE RCMP'S NATIONAL SECURITY ACTIVITIES (2006), [hereinafter
ARAR COMM'N, A NEW REVIEW MECHANISM], available at
http://www.ararcommission.ca/engfEnglishReportDec122006.pdf.
184. See ARAR COMM'N, ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 182, at
312-16.
185. Id. at 316-22.
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respecting personal information and human rights."'" These
policies, subsequently outlined in the Fourth Report,n must be
attached as a caveat to any information shared with foreign
agencies." Most importantly, if foreign agencies made "improper
use" of the information provided by Canadian agencies, "a formal
objection should be made to the foreign agency and the foreign
minister of the recipient country."'89 The Arar Commission further
stated that "it is essential that there be a proper and professional
assessment of the reliability of information ... received ... from
countries with questionable human rights records."' 90
The clear aim of these recommendations is to prevent
Canadian agencies from using information obtained by torture or
human rights abuses. "' The Arar Commission's findings on the
conduct of the RCMP triggered a negative public reaction, which
convinced the government to publicly acknowledge, by formal
apology, the RCMP's mistakes in Arar and to award the victim
over ten million Canadian dollars in compensation for damages
incurred because of the RCMP's misinformation."n Although the
American Arar Court, defending the secrecy of the ERP,
continued to maintain that "the need for much secrecy can hardly
be doubted,"'9'3 Canada decided to inform the public of the U.S.
governmental agencies' questionable behavior and to conduct a
complete investigation on the relevant facts and remedies of the
case.' 4 A formal protest by the Canadian Prime Minister to
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice also followed. ' 95
186. Id. at 334.
187. ARAR COMM'N, A NEW REVIEW MECHANISM, supra note 183.
188. ARAR COMM'N, ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 182, at 339-42.
189. Id. at 344.
190. Id. at 348.
191. Id. ("Canadian agencies must exercise care in agreeing to receive information
from countries with questionable human rights records. It is important that, in doing so,
they not appear to encourage or in any way condone abuse of human rights or the use of
torture.").
192. See Prime Minister Announces. $10.5-Million Compensation for Maher Arar, CAN.
PRESS, Jan. 26, 2007.
193. Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250, 281 (E.D.N.Y. 2006); but see Michael V.
Sage, The Exploitation of Legal Loopholes in the Name of National Security: A Case Study
on Extraordinary Rendition, 37 CAL. W. INT'L L. J. 121, 129 (2006) (critiquing the Arar
court's central holding that the need for state secrecy trumped Arar's constitutional
rights).
194. Meagan Fitzpartick, Ottawa Launching "Formal Protest" over U.S. Treatment of
Maher Arar, NAT'L POST (Can.), Oct. 6, 2006.
195. Id.
[Vol. 30:33
2008] Reactions to the United States Rendition Program 61
Finally, the Boumediene case is worthy of mention. In
October 2001, the police of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina
arrested Lakhdar Boumediene and five other people (the Algerian
Six) on the charge of having planned an assault on the U.S. and
British embassies in Sarajevo." Among them, five had obtained
Bosnian citizenship, and one was a resident under permission."
On January 17, 2002, the investigative judge of the Bosnian
Federation's Supreme Court ordered their release due to a lack of
grounds for further detention.9 The court delivered the order that
afternoon; that evening, the Chamber of Human Rights of Bosnia-
Herzegovina (CHR) issued an interim order to prevent the
detainees' transfer. ' Nevertheless, the police handed over the
prisoners to U.S. forces."9 In late January, the U.S. government
declared that it had detained the six men in Guantanamo.20'
On October 12, 2002, the CHR determined that police
removed the Algerian Six illegally, and that the Bosnian
government violated the European Convention of Human
Rights. Subsequently, the CHR ordered Bosnian State and
Federation authorities to undertake a number of measures to
counteract the violations, such as the annulment of the removal
order .2 ' The fact that the Bosnian government disregarded two
196. Amnesty Int'l, Bosnia-Herzegovina: Unlawful Detention of Six Men from Bosnia-
Herzegovina in Guantanamo Bay, AI Index EUR 63/013/2003, May 30, 2003.
197. See id. at 1.
198. Id. at 2.
199. See id. (granting a request made by the detainees who feared extradition to
Algeria, where they were believed that they would be subjected to torture by Algerian
authorities).
200. Id. at 3.
201. Id.
202. Id. The ECHR is in force in Bosnia-Herzegovina according to Article 1 of the
Dayton Agreement, which incorporates, the Convention. See General Framework
Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bosnia and Herzegovina-Croatia-
Yugoslavia [Dayton Agreement] art.1, 'Nov. 21, 1995, U.N. Doc. S/1995/999, A150/79C.
Additionally Article 11(2) of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Constitution, which is devoted to
human rights, stipulates that "[tihe rights and freedoms set forth in the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and its
Protocols shall apply directly." CONSTITUTION OF BOSN. & HERz. art. 11(2).
203. Specifically, the CHR ordered the government to address the following violations
of the ECHR: Art. 1 of Protocol 7 (right not to be arbitrarily expelled in the absence of a
fair procedure); Art. 5(1) (right to liberty and security of person); Art. 6(2) (right to be
presumed innocent until proven guilty); Art. 1 of Protocol 6 (right to not to be subjected
to death penalty). See James Sloan, Dayton Peace Agreements: Human Rights Guarantees
and Their Implementation, 7 EUR. J. INT'L L. 207, 209 (1996); Amnesty Int'l, supra note
196, at 3.
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different orders from domestic courts obviously exacerbated the
conflict between powers. The CHR instructed the government to
"use all diplomatic channels in order to protect the basic rights of
the applicants, taking all possible steps to establish contacts with
the applicants and to provide them with consular support,"2' 0 and
to "prevent the death penalty from being pronounced against and
executed on the applicants.....
In addition to the judicial and the executive branches, the
conflict also involved the legislature. On May 11, 2004, the House
of Representatives of the Parliament of Bosnia-Herzegovina
adopted a report by a parliamentary Commission for Human
Rights, Immigration, Refugees and Asylum.' In 2005, the same
body demanded the Council of Ministers of Bosnia and
Herzegovina to urge the U.S. government to release the Bosnian
detainees held at Guantanamo .' Finally, Boumediene's attorneys
filed a petition before the European Court of Human Rights,
citing the CHR decision of 2002, in support of their argument that
Bosnia-Herzegovina breached the European Convention of
Human Rights."
Initially, it is possible to infer from these examples that a
nation's foreign policy is no longer the strict prerogative of the
executive branch or the parliament. Although this is a domestic
constitutional issue, it triggers relevant political effects at the
international level. By incriminating U.S. citizens acting in their
official capacity, other national courts may embarrass and strain
possibly already delicate relations with the United States. Indeed,
the questioning of various international and domestic courts raises
serious doubts about the legitimacy of a government's behavior in
cooperating with the ERP, especially in the eyes of the public. It
also destabilizes the U.S. government's efforts in the global war on
terror, and may even potentially delegitimize the U.S. government
itself.
204. Amnesty Int'l, supra note 196, at 4 (quoting Human Rights Chamber for Bosnia
& Herzegovina, Decision on Admissibility and Merits, Oct. [11], 2002). The opinion of the
Bosnian CHR was also included as an annex to Boumediene's petition in front of the
European Court of Human Rights. See Application at Annex 3, Lakhdar Boumediene v.
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Case No. 38703/06 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Sept. 26, 2006) [hereinafter
Boumediene Application].
205. Amnesty Int'l, supra note 196, at 4.
206. Boumediene Application, supra note 204, 1 43.
207. Id. J 56.
208. See id. T 114.
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Moreover, the international implications of the court's
intervention should be considered. For instance, in the case of the
Italian and German officials' involvement in the ERP, the
European arrest warrants against the CIA agents extend
throughout the entire European Union. Thus, it concerns all
European criminal courts by default. This raises significant
political issues for all states in the EU, not only for the state whose
court issued the warrants. The involvement of EU domestic courts
is therefore bound to have political implications for the
relationship between local secret services and the CIA.
In addition, one should wonder why national governments
vigorously insist on protecting their involvement in ERP actions by
way of the state secrecy defense. Since this seems to be a common
trend in both European countries and the United States, it is
natural to ask whether a new transnational concept of state secrecy
will arise from judicial disputes concerning the ERP. Irrespective
of the constitutional concerns of the state secrecy doctrine,
governments who invoke this defense usually justify it through
reasons of national security. But, since ERP actions "[t]ook place
with the requisitepermissions, protections, or active assistance of
government agencies,"" it is likely that high among these national
security concerns are reliance on, and the protection provided by,
an alliance with the United States."' Clearly, this results in a trend
of concealment of some aspects of international relations from
democratic scrutiny, and, more generally, a lack of accountability.
These episodes demonstrate that, although the conflict
regarding the legality of rendition may appear to exclusively
impact the domestic legal order, the current trend of questioning
renditions under ERP must also be considered as the dominant
legal order at an international level.
B. The European Struggle: Hard Reactions Against Blind Eyes
1. The Council of Europe: Blind Eyes on Human Rights
The Council of Europe (COE), a political organization with a
broader membership than the EU, intervened against ERP action
209. Secret Detentions: Second Report, supra note 59, pt. C, 1 10.
210. In fact, "[i]n Italy, as in Germany, irrespective of the alternation in political power
between parties, the same line has apparently been chosen, namely the preservation at any
price of relations (and especially of interests) with the powerful ally, with 'state secrecy'
being invoked whenever an unpleasant truth might become public." Id. pt. C, 323.
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that took place within the territories of its member states. The
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE)
formed an investigation committee, presided over by Swiss senator
Dick Marty (Marty's Committee), while the secretary-general of
the COE made inquiry to member state governments regarding
the existence of secret CIA detention facilities in their territories,
pursuant to procedure established by Article 52 of the European
Convention on Human Rights.21' Additionally, PACE requested an
advisory opinion from the European Commission for Democracy
Through Law, commonly referred to as the "Venice Commission,"
on the legality of secret detention with regard to states' obligations
under the European Convention on Human Rights.212
On February 26, 2006, the secretary-general published a first
report on the states' responses.2 13 The report focuses on three
aspects of European Convention on Human Rights enforcement:
(1) effective domestic laws to sanction the Convention's breaches,
(2) omissions in the enforcement of the Convention, and (3)
significant controls on the air traffic within states' jurisdiction.
211. See Secret Detentions: Second Report, supra note 59, pt. C, 9 (describing the
formation of Marty's Committee and summarizing the committee's published findings as
of the date of its second report). Pursuant to Article 52, the Secretary General of the COE
is, in fact, empowered to request "any High Contracting Party ... [to] furnish an
explanation of the manner in which its internal law ensures the effective implementation
of any of the provisions of th[e European Convention of Human Rights]." ECHR, supra
note 110, art. 52.
212. Venice Comm'n, supra note 40.
213. Eur. Sec'y-Gen., Secretary General's Report Under Article 52 ECHR on the
Question of Secret Detention and Transport of Detainees Suspected of Terrorist Acts,
Notably by or at the Instigation of Foreign Agencies, at 5, Doc. No. SG/Inf (2006).
214. Id. 20, 22-23. "Such renditions involve multiple human rights violations,
including transfer in breach of the principle of non-refoulement, as well as arbitrary arrest
and incommunicado detention. The victim is placed in a situation of complete
defencelessness with no judicial control or oversight by the European Committee for the
Prevention of Torture (CPT) leaving the door open for the use of torture and other forms
of ill-treatment. According to the [ECHR], the unacknowledged detention of an
individual is a complete negation of the Convention's guarantees against arbitrary
deprivation of liberty and a most grave violation of Article 5 (right to liberty and
security)." Id. (citing Kurt v. Turkey, 27 Eur. Ct. H.R. 373, §§ 123-24 (1998)). The COE
secretary-general also states that "[t]he arbitrary arrest, detention and transfer of an
individual" affects human rights in violation of "Articles 8 (right to respect for private and
family life), Article 13 (right to an effective remedy) and Article 2 of Protocol No. 4
(freedom of movement), as well as, depending on the circumstances, Article 2 (right to
life) and Article 3 (prohibition of torture)." Id. $ 22. The COE secretary-general further
noted that, although "[t]he activities of foreign agencies cannot be attributed directly to
States Parties ... [tiheir responsibility may nevertheless be engaged on account of either
their duty to refrain from aid or assistance in the commission of wrongful conduct,
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Interestingly, the report states that some responses were
215incomplete or extremely generic. Moreover, although some
states provided a regulatory framework for the activities of foreign
agents on their territories, 21 6 the parliamentary or judicial controls
on these activities are generally limited in several ways,"7 and most
actions of foreign officials are protected by the foreign agents'
immunity exception. 8 Indeed, the restraints on flights within
domestic airspace have been surprisingly ineffective;21 1 thus, any
foreign airplane could engage in illegal activities, such as those
carried out by through the ERP, in several member states without
difficulty. °
An intriguing finding was the extent to which some states
clearly dissimulated their own roles in specific ERP actions. For
instance, the Italian government denied any involvement of its
public officials in "flying prisons" - words that still remain obscure
in meaning - notwithstanding the ongoing criminal proceedings in
Milan.2 Similarly, the Republic of Macedonia did not respond to
the question of involvement,22 nor did Bosnia-Herzegovina.223 It
seems obvious from these reactions that the questions posed by
the secretary-general were disconcerting to these governments,
acquiescence and connivance in such conduct, or, more generally, their positive
obligations under the Convention. In accordance with the generally recognised rules on
State responsibility, States may be held responsible of aiding or assisting another State in
the commission of an internationally wrongful act. There can be little doubt that aid and
assistance by agents of a State Party in the commission of human rights abuses by agents
of another State acting within the former's jurisdiction would constitute a violation of the
Convention. Even acquiescence and connivance of the authorities in the acts of foreign.
agents affecting Convention rights might engage the State Party's responsibility under the
Convention. Of course, any such vicarious responsibility presupposes that the authorities
of States Parties had knowledge of the said activities." Id. 23.
215. Id. 17-19.
216. Id.
217. Id. 41.
218. Id. T 70-71 (citing international jurisprudence that addresses the problem of
immunity of foreign agents with regard to violations of human rights).
219. Id. 54.
220. Id. TT 54-55.
221. Id. 91 (noting that by "[g]iving only a partial reply to the question about
involvement and not replying at all to the question about official investigations, Italy has
failed to provide information about the well-known ongoing criminal investigation into the
alleged abduction of Abu Omar by CIA agents in Italy, in contrast to Germany and
Switzerland which provide information about ongoing investigations by their own
authorities").
222. Id. 90.
223. Id.
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which are already mired in court battles at home." The
insufficiency or incompleteness of their answers is a clear signal, in
the view of the COE secretary-general, that the European
Convention of Human Rights needs a more powerful enforcement
framework to deal with illegal actions like those of the ERP.25 On
April 12, 2006, the secretary-general held a press conference and
concluded that "virtually none of our member states have proper
legislative and administrative measures to effectively protect
individuals against violations of human rights committed by agents
of friendly foreign security services operating in their territory."
26
Marty's Committee published its first report in 2006.22' The
report affirms that:
the CIA "rendition" programme has revealed a network that
resembles a "spider's web" spun across the globe .... Analysis
of the network's functioning.., allows us to make a number of
conclusions both about human rights violations - some of which
continue - and about the responsibilities of some [COE]
Member states . . . .[I]t is only through the intentional or
grossly negligent collusion of the European partners that this
'web' was able to spread also over Europe.
According to the Committee,
across the world, the United States has progressively woven a
clandestine "spider's web" of disappearances, secret detentions
and unlawful inter-state transfers, often encompassing countries
notorious for their use of torture. Hundreds of persons have
become entrapped in this web, in some cases merely suspected
229of sympathising with a presumed terrorist organisation.
Marty's Committee repeatedly emphasizes the illegality of
and inadequate governmental response to ERP actions. First, as to
the legitimacy of the state secret defense, the committee urges that
actions of secret government agencies be brought under the
224. Id. IT 90-93.
225. See id. 101.
226. Speaking Notes for the Press Conference of Terry Davis, Secretary General of the
Council of Europe, Apr. 12, 2006, available at http://www.coe.intfT/E/ComlFilesPA-
Sessions/April-2006/20060412_Speaking-notes-sg.asp.
227. Eur. Parl. Ass. Comm. on Legal Affairs & Human Rights, Alleged Secret
Detentions and Unlawful Inter-State Transfers of Detainees Involving Council of Europe
Member States: First Report, Doc. No. 10957 (June 12, 2006) [hereinafter Alleged Secret
Detentions: First Report].
228. Id. pt. C, IT 280-84.
229. Id. pt. A, 5.
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scrutiny of the national parliaments or the judicial branches.23
Second, the committee strongly recommended that member states
and the United States report renditions of suspected terrorists
under the rule of law."' Third, the Committee makes a point of
appreciating the work done by public prosecutors232  and
parliamentary inquiry commssons to ascertain the violations of
human rights that occurred in relation to specific ERP actions,
such as Abu OmarT3 and El-Masri."' As to the culpability of
member states, Marty's Committee concluded that some were
directly responsible for the ERP, some turned a blind eye to CIA
actions on their territories, and others deliberately refused to
know.236
Interestingly, Marty's Committee directly challenged the
position taken by the United States, as evidenced in a meeting
held by U.S. delegate John Bellinger before the UN Committee
Against Torture in May 2006.37 The Committee pointed out that
"the United States does not see itself bound to satisfy anyone's
interpretation of international law but its own, 2 38 and that "[t]he
United States' formalistic and positivist approach shocks the legal
sensibilities of Europeans, who are rather influenced by
230. Id. pt. A, 1 12 ("[t]he Assembly takes the view that neither national security nor
state secrecy can be invoked in such a sweeping, systematic fashion as to shield these
unlawful operations from robust parliamentary and judicial scrutiny").
231. The United States has the status of an observer of the COE. The Committee is
particularly shrewd on this point, expressly challenging the position taken by the U.S.
administration and proposing an alternative framework for the ERP. Specifically, the
Committee comments that "[t]he American administration states that rendition is a vital
tool in the fight against international terrorism. We consider that renditions may be
acceptable, and indeed desirable, only if they satisfy a number of very specific
requirements (which, with a few exceptions, has not been the case in any of the known
renditions to date). If a state is unable, or does not wish, to prosecute a suspect, it should
be possible to apply the following principle: no person genuinely suspected of a serious act
of terrorism should feel safe anywhere in the world. In such cases, however, the person in
question may be handed over only to a state able to provide all the guarantees of a fair
trial, or - even better - to an international jurisdiction, which in my view should be
established as a matter of urgency." Id. pt. C, 261.
232. Id. pt. C, 1 237-45.
233. Id. pt. C, 246-53.
234. See id. pt. C, 237 (pointing out that "the Italian judicial authorities and police
have shown great competence and remarkable independence in the face of political
pressures").
235. Id. pt. C, 238.
236. Id. pt. C, 1 285; see also Geoff Meade, Britain Named for Colluding in US
Rendition Flights, INDEPENDENT (U.K.), June 7, 2006.
237. Alleged Secret Detentions: First Report, supra note 227, pt. C, IT1 265-74.
238. Id. pt. C, 271.
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'teleological' considerations. In other words, the European
approach is to opt for an interpretation that affords maximum
protection to the values on which the legal rule is based.,
239
This appears to be the first time that a democratic assembly of
an international organization issues such a strong message to the
government of the United States about the interpretation of
international law. Clearly, this statement reveals concerns that an
entire framework of human rights, specifically the European
framework, might be disregarded for being too protective of
individual rights.24 More importantly, Marty's Committee and the
subsequent resolution of the Parliamentary Assembly struggle
over the legality of the ERP and attempt to bring its legal analysis
of what was initially a purely foreign policy matter to a deeper
confrontation with public opinion, courts and democratic inquiry
commissions."'
The Venice Commission undertook a purely legal approach
to the problem of the ERP in an opinion published on March 17,
2006.22 The Opinion dealt with three issues: (1) the problem of
regular versus irregular inter-state transfers of prisoners;2 13 (2)
violations of human rights caused by the irregular inter-state
transfers; 2" and (3) the specific COE members' obligations under
the European Convention on Human Rights." First, the
Commission pointed out that every transfer of individuals besides
the "four situations in which a State may lawfully transfer a
prisoner to another state" (i.e., deportation, extradition, transit
and transfer)," is undisputedly irregular. "7 Irregularity is,
therefore, linked to actions outside of the conventional framework
and, by implication, outside of the law.248
With regard to human rights violations, the ERP impacts
those human rights established by the European Convention on
Human Rights - in particular, the right to liberty and security
239. Id. pt. C, 272.
240. See id.
241. Id. pt. A, j 19.1 (calling on the United States to "send a strong message to the
world by demonstrating that terrorism can be vanquished by lawful means, thereby
proving the superiority of the democratic model founded on respect of human dignity").
242. Venice Comm'n, supra note 40.
243. Id. [ 10-31.
244. Id. [ 47-77.
245. Id. 116-53.
246. Id. 9 10.
247. Id. $$ 24-29.
248. Id. T 29.
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under Article 5 § 1 of the Convention.2 9 It also impacts the
prohibition of torture under the jus cogens, including the
obligation to investigate every case of torture which has arisen by
circumstance."°
Finally, as to the obligations by which the members of the
COE currently abide, the Venice Commission clarifies that:
[a]ny arrest of a person by foreign authorities on the territory of
a [COE] member State without the agreement of this member
State is a violation of its sovereignty and is therefore contrary to
international law . . . [and further] affects that person's
individual right to security under Article 5 § 1 [of the European
Convention on Human Rights] .
251
Indeed, where the concerned government consents to the
rendition, "the question of governmental control over the
security/police services, and . . . of parliamentary control over the
government" may arise."2 In the Commission's view, this situation
signifies more than a simple political problem, since "[t]he Statute
of the [COE] and the [European Convention on Human Rights]
249. ECHR, supra note 110, art. 5(1). The Venice Commission emphasizes, in this
respect, that "[t]he possible reasons for detention are exhaustively enumerated in Article 5
(1) [of the ECHR]. Paragraph 1(c) of Article 5 permits 'the lawful arrest or detention of a
person effected for the purpose of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably
considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so,'
while paragraph (f) of Article 5 permits 'the lawful arrest or detention of a person to
prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom
action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition.' A detention for any reason
other than those listed in Article 5 § 1 is unlawful and thus a violation of a human right."
Venice Comm'n, supra note 40, 50 (emphasis added). The Commission further notes
that "Article 5 must be seen as requiring the authorities of the territorial State to take
effective measures to safeguard against the risk of disappearance and to conduct a prompt
effective investigation into a substantiated claim that a person has been taken into custody
and has not been seen since." Id. 53 (citing Kurt v. Turkey, 27 Eur. Ct. H.R. 373 (1988)).
250. Specifically, "Member States of the [ECHR] not only have the obligation not to
torture but also the duty to prevent torture. In addition they have an obligation of
investigation. Under this obligation Member States must assure an efficient, effective and
impartial investigation. As soon as the authorities receive substantiated information giving
rise to the suspicion that torture or inhuman or degrading treatment has been committed,
a duty to investigate arises whether and in which circumstances torture has been
committed." Venice Comm'n, supra note 40, 61 (footnotes omitted); see also CAT,
supra note 110, arts. 4, 9.
251. Venice Comm'n, supra note 40, 116 (internal quotations omitted) (citing
Stock6 v. Germany, 13 Eur. Ct. H.R. 839, 167 (1991)).
252. Id. 119.
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require respect for the rule of law which in turn requires
accountability for all exercises of public power.,13
Moreover, any extrajudicial detentions within the COE's
boundaries, whether maintained under the control of a foreign
country or directly held by member states' governments, are
inconsistent with Article 5 of the European Convention on Human
Rights. 4 In particular, inconsistencies persist when COE member
states fail to take "effective measures to safeguard against the risk
of disappearance, '' "5 as well as when European Convention on
Human Rights violations take place in territories subject to the
relevant treaties, operating under the exclusive control of foreign
military forces, like NATO."6 In this case, the Venice Commission
emphasizes that COE member states have the precise duty to
prevent and respond to abuses; for instance, by registering and
controlling aliens' access to the foreign military base. 7 These
measures are, in fact, perfectly legal under the relevant treaties,
subject only to an obligation of notification. 8 As another means of
response, the concerned states could exploit diplomatic channels
to issue a protest.Y
Furthermore, in assessing the problem of the European
Convention on Human Rights' spatial extension, the Venice
Commission points out that member states have an obligation to
ensure that no violations take place in their airspace or within their
253. Id. 120. The Commission further stresses that "[d]ifferent European States
exercise different systems for political insight into, and control over, the operations of the
security and intelligence services, depending upon constitutional structure, historical
factors etc. Different mechanisms exist for ensuring that particularly sensitive operations
are subject to approval and/or adequate control. Meaningful government accountability to
the legislature is obviously conditioned upon meaningful governmental control over the
security and intelligence services. Where the law provides for governmental control, but
this control does. not exist in practice, the security and intelligence services risk becoming a
'State within a State.' Where, on the other hand, the law provides for a degree of distance
between government ministers and officials and the day-to-day operations of the security
and intelligence services, but government ministers in fact exercise influence or even
control over these operations, then the phenomenon of 'deniability' can arise. In such a
case, the exercise of power is concealed, and there is no proper accountability. ...
Independently of how a State chooses to regulate political control over security and
intelligence agencies, in any case effective oversight and control mechanisms must exist to
avoid these two problems." Id. (citations omitted).
254. See id. 124.
255. Id. 1 127.
256. Id. 129-31.
257. Id. 1 130-32.
258. Id. $ 131.
259. See id. $ 132.
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territories.' Thus, the European Convention on Human Rights
must receive full implementation at the member state level.
Although the Commission was fully aware of the practical
difficulties involved in controlling airplanes in transit, it
maintained that when a suspected flight is at issue, states possess
all the necessary instruments to react properly, and to ensure that
those flights do not breach human rights obligations. On this
point, the Commission further concludes that "there is no
international obligation for [member states] to allow irregular
transfers of prisoners to or to grant unconditional overflight rights,
for the purposes of fighting terrorism."262
In sum, the COE directs multiple concerns toward member
states on the legal framework of the ERP. The general trend of
COE recommendations is to strengthen the enforcement of human
rights protection in the face of the ERP. As a remedy, the COE
points to the need for democratic legitimations of secret agencies'
260. See id. 145.
261. The hypothesis considered by the Venice Commission occurs when the "member
State has serious reasons to believe that the mission of an airplane crossing its airspace is
to carry prisoners with the intention of transferring them to countries where they would
face ill-treatment." Id. 144. The Commission cites the Chicago Convention of 1944. See
Convention on International Civil Aviation art. 3, Dec. 7, 1944, 15 U.N.T.S. 295. The
Chicago Convention applies only to civil aircraft and not to state aircraft. Id. art. 3(b-e).
However, the aircrafts carrying detainees are clearly "state aircrafts" for the purposes of
the Convention. Id. art. 3(b) ("[a]ircraft used in military ... and police services shall be
deemed to be state aircrafts"). If the flight operators presented the airplane as a civil one,
the Commission found a violation of art. 3(c) of the Chicago Convention, according to
which "[n]o state aircraft of a contracting State shall fly over the territory of another State
or land thereon without authorization by special agreement or otherwise, and in
accordance with the terms thereof." Id. art. 3(c); Venice Comm'n, supra note 40, 148.
According to the Venice Commission, in this case "the territorial state may therefore
require landing," and proceed with searches. Id. When the aircraft identifies itself as a
state flight, but without revealing its mission, the Venice Commission found that the flag
state violated its international obligation. Id. 1 149. In this case, the territorial state cannot
proceed with a seizure or a search of the aircraft, but it could nevertheless prohibit further
flights over the airspace or impose a duty to submit to searches, or protest by diplomatic
channels. See id. 149-51. Furthermore, "any violations of civil aviation principles in
relation to irregular transport of prisoners should be denounced, and brought to the
attention of the competent authorities and eventually of the public." Id. 1 152. The
"competent authorities" would include, at the level on Convention's enforcement, the
Council of the International Civil Aviation Organization [ICAO]. See Convention on
International Civil Aviation, supra, art. 54(i), (j); see also Olivier Dutheillet de Lamothe,
Extraordinary Renditions: A European Perspective (Sept. 25, 2006), available at
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2006/nov/venice-commission-rendition-speech.pdf.
262. Venice Comm'n, supra note 40,1153.
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behavior, and the Judiciary's involvement.26  Although the
Parliamentary Assembly of the COE has no coercive power
against member states, its democratic legitimation and
supranational position allows the COE to deeply affect the
behavior of national governments. Additionally, the Assembly
may fuel a national debate on how to implement values protected
by the COE: namely, human rights enumerated under the
European Convention on Human Rights. For purposes of
strengthening the enforcement of human rights protections, it can
be said to strongly emphasize the actual illegality of the ERP.
2. The European Parliament Resolution
On February 14, 2007, a resolution by the European
Parliament (EP) concluded that, although "not all those flights
have been used for extraordinary rendition," there were "at least
1,245 flights operated by the CIA ... into European airspace or
stopped over at European airports between the end of 2001 and
the end of 2005. '26" This is the result of an investigation conducted
by an ad hoc committee, namely the Temporary Committee on the
Alleged Use of European Countries by the CIA for Illegal
Activities (TDIP), which issued a report on January 31, 2007
(Report). This Committee was elected in 2005 by the Parliament
to determine the role of certain member states of the European
Union (EU) in the ERP.
263. The Venice Commission also adopted a report concerning the role of intelligence
agencies in democratic societies. See generally Venice Comm'n, Report on the Democratic
Oversight of the Security Services, Study No. 388/2006/CDL-AD/2007/016 (2007).
264. Press Release, Eur. Union Justice & Home Affairs, CIA Activities in Europe:
European Parliament Adopts Final Report Deploring Passivity from Some Member States
(Feb. 14, 2007) (on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles International & Comparative Law
Review).
265. Eur. Parl. Ass., Resolution on Presumed Use of European Countries by the CIA
for the Transportation and Illegal Detention of Prisoners, at 509, Doc. No.
P6_TA(2005)0529 (Jan. 31, 2007).
266. Id.; see also Eur. Parl. Ass., Decision Setting Up a Temporary Committee on the
Alleged Use of European Countries by the CIA for the Transportation and Illegal Detention
of Prisoners [TDIP], at 159, Doc. No. P6_- TA(2006)0012 (2006) [hereinafter Decision
Setting Up a Temporary Committee]. Among other purposes, the TDIP is charged with
determining whether "such actions ... could be considered a violation inter alia of Article
6 of the Treaty on European Union, Articles 2, 3, 5 and 6 of the European Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the Charter of Fundamental
Rights, the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, the EU-US agreements on extradition and on mutual legal
assistance and other international treaties and agreements concluded by the European
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The Report focuses on three aspects. First, the TDIP
considers the ERP counterproductive and affirms that the ERP
violates international law.267 Further, it firmly:
[c]ondemns extraordinary rendition as an illegal instrument
used by the United States in the fight against terrorism [and]
the condoning and concealing of the practice, on several
occasions, by the secret services and governmental authorities
of certain European countries.
Second, the TDIP - and the European Parliament thereafter
- stressed that it received inadequate cooperation from its member
states and other European institutions, especially the EU Council
of Ministers. Specifically, the TDIP lamented that the level of
cooperation "has fallen far below the standard that Parliament is
entitled to expect,, 27 and formally criticized the refusal by some
officials to appear or keep the TDIP informed.27' The Committee's
concerns, the Report reads, directly affect the obligations of the
European institutions to keep the Parliament informed of the EU
foreign policy, 272 and could raise the question of responsibility of
member states for violation of the EU Treaties. 3
Moreover, the TDIP expressed its appreciation for the
judicial authorities in some member states, in particular Italy,
Germany and Spain, and recommended that the judiciaries of
Union/Community and its Member States, including the North Atlantic Treaty and its
related agreements on the status of forces and the Convention on International Civil
Aviation." Id. at 160.
267. See TDIP, Report on the Alleged Use of European Countries by the CIA for the
Transportation and Detention of Prisoners, 1 1, Doc. No. A6-0020/2007 (Jan. 30, 2007).
[hereinafter TDIP Report]. "[T]he fight against terrorism must be fought on the basis of,
and in order to protect, our common values of democracy, the rule of law, human rights
and fundamental freedoms ... all the work carried out by the Temporary Committee is
intended to make a contribution towards the development of clear and focused measures
in the fight against terrorism, which are commonly accepted and respect national and
international law." Id.
268. Id. 39.
269. Id. 13.
270. Id. 13.
271. Id. TT 26, 28, 34 (addressing the unsatisfactory answers given by EU Counter-
terrorism Coordinator, Gijs de Vries, to questions posed by the Temporary Committee);
Id. 29 (addressing the refusal of Max-Peter Ratzel, Director of Europol, to appear); Id.
34 (addressing the refusals of former and current Secretaries-General of NATO, Lord
Robertson and Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, to appear).
272. See id. 22 (deploring "the failure by the Council and its Presidency to comply
with their obligations to keep Parliament fully informed of the main aspects and basic
choices of the [C]ommon [F]oreign and [S]ecurity [Plolicy [CFSP]").
273. Id. 24.
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other states follow these examples.27' While it supported the
intervention of domestic courts, the TDIP also complained that
state executives were "turning a blind eye or admitting flights
operated by the, CIA,""27  affirming that when courts began
proceedings against some government officials, their denial of
involvement in certain abduction cases suggested deception."6
Finally, as to sanctions, the TDIP vigorously urged states and
EU legislators to review the limits of the secret defense,77 and
generally deplored the unresponsiveness of states and EU
institutions to ERP actions within their own territories. 8 The
TDIP concluded by recommending, among other things, that the
EU Council investigate violations of the human rights protection
clause sanctioned by Article 6 of the EU Treaty and adopt
appropriate sanctions against Member States. 29
Although the TDIP's conclusions were not exhaustive,'
deliberations by the democratic organ of the world's most
powerful and highly developed international organization may
impact future assessments of the problem at the continental level.
European institutions - particularly the Council, which represents
the interests of Member States - will be very concerned with the
EP's findings, especially in light of member deception on the
matter. Moreover, three important issues are at stake: activities of
secret services, counterterrorism measures, .and interstate
cooperation. If the EP retains those elements that were
significantly threatened by the illegal ERP action, how could
governments still defend the ERP?
274. Id. 15; accord id. 1 186 (urging "European countries ... to commence such
proceedings as soon as possible" and "recall[ing] that, according to the case law of the
[ECtHR], there is a positive obligation on Member States to investigate allegations of and
sanction human rights violations in breach of the ECHR").
275. Id. 43.
276. Id. 91 52 (condemning SISMI officials for "conceal[ing] the truth" while testifying
before the Committee about their involvement in Abu Omar's abduction).
277. Id. 192.
278. See id. 43 (noting that European countries have effectively relinquished control
of their airspace to the CIA); see generally id. 1$ 49-182, at 12-28 (citing specific failures of
Member States to prevent ERP actions).
279. Id. [1$ 186, 226, 228.
280. See id. 91 225 (stressing, "in view of the powers it was provided with and of the
time which it had at its disposal, and the secret nature of the investigated actions, that the
Temporary Committee was not put in a position fully to investigate all the cases of abuses
and violations falling within its remit and that its conclusions are therefore not
exhaustive").
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V. CONCLUSIONS
"Such renditions are permissible under international law,"
281
Condoleezza Rice remarked in 2005; John Bellinger added, "[w]e
do take our obligations seriously under the [CAT]. We think that
we are in compliance with our obligations. '' "n These positions are
inconsistent with any thoughtful perception of the legal framework
surrounding the ERP. Moreover, they offend European
institutions and prominent international scholars, who argue
exactly the opposite.83
U.S. opposition towards challenges to the ERP's legitimacy,
accompanied by the silence of some European governments, calls
into question the basis and effectiveness of the "War on Terror."
Times seem deeply changed since the days immediately following
9/11, when Le Monde's front-page editorial evinced solidarity and
passion with the United States: "Today, we are all Americans.
2
8
The words of U.S. Rep. William Delahunt suffice to depict the
present situation, when he said, "Sadly, this support has eroded
dramatically.... [W]orld opinion has turned against the United
States in recent years. . . . [T]his reality, this trend of opinion
against the United States has profound negative consequences for
our national interests. 28
There is evidence that a conflict has arisen between specific
international organizations and their member states regarding the
way in which the latter face the exigency of preventing terrorist
281. 'Renditions Save Lives': Condoleezza Rice's Full Statement, supra note 58.
282. Bellinger Breifing, supra note 120.
283. See, e.g., M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Regression of the Rule of Law under the Guise
of Combating Terrorism, 76 INT'L REV. PEN. L. 17, 22 (2005) (stating that the ERP "is
unquestionably illegal"); see also. Leila Nadya Sadat, "Torture and the War on Terror":
Ghost Prisoners and Black Sites: Extraordinary Rendition Under International Law, 37
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 309, 341 (2006) ("[p]roponents of these policies no doubt
sincerely believe that they are justified, indeed, necessary to win the [global war on
terrorism]. Yet ... they are surely not "legal" as that term is customarily understood.").
284. Jean-Marie Colombani, Editorial, Nous sommes tous Amdricains [Today We Are
All Americans], LE MONDE, Sept. 13, 2001, http://www.lemonde.fr/web/article/0,1-0@2-
3232,36-913706,0.html.
285. Extraordinary Rendition in U.S. Counterteriorism Policy: The Impact on
Transatlantic Relations: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Int'l Orgs., Human Rights,
and Oversight and the Subcomm. on Europe of the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 110th
Cong. 1 (2007) (opening remarks of Rep. William Delahunt, Chairman, Subcomm. on Int'l
Orgs., Human Rights, and Oversight).
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attacks.' In particular, several international organs make it clear
that European states who collaborate with the ERP are
accomplices to grave violations of international law, the CAT, and
the European Convention on Human Rights.2" The common
sympathies among democratic organs of European organizations
like the EP, the Parliamentary Assembly of the COE, as well as
the many prosecutors, judges, and inquiry commissions
questioning ERP actions at the domestic level, all raise a broader
question of whether governmental authority in determining
foreign policy is entirely consistent with respect to the rule of law.
If the pressures coming from these supranational initiatives trigger
concerned states to refrain from cooperating with the CIA in this
"spider's web," that issue will need to be addressed as well. While
it may be too early to identify practical results, it is unlikely that
governments - under the constraints of parliaments and courts -
would ignore these pressures or defend the ERP. This is true both
legally and politically. That law and politics will stand for the
protection of human dignity and the rule of law, rather than for
immediate political expediency, hopefully seems only a question of
time.
286. See, e.g., TDIP Report, supra note 267, 2 (noting outgoing UN Secretary-
General Kofi Annan's observation that "the so-called 'war on terror' - in its excesses - has
produced a serious and dangerous erosion of human rights and fundamental freedoms").
287. See, e.g., id F ("extraordinary rendition and secret detention involve multiple
violations of human rights").
[Vol. 30:33
